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ABSTRACT  
   
Guided by Alberts, Tracy and Trethewey's (2011) integrated theory of the 
division of domestic labor, this dissertation examined the influence of domestic 
labor response threshold (i.e., the point at which one is sufficiently disturbed by a 
task undone so as to feel compelled to attend to it) on domestic labor performance 
and domestic labor conflict. Three-hundred-ten heterosexual participants (155 
marital dyads; average marriage length of 20 years) completed an online 
questionnaire about their performance of household labor, household labor 
conflict, and response thresholds. Response thresholds were assessed using 
traditional verbal measures as well as two visual (i.e., photographic) measures 
developed for this investigation. The data were analyzed using three methods of 
dyadic data analysis: structural equation modeling, repeated measures 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), and actor-partner interdependence 
models using multilevel modeling. Results indicate that the lower one's response 
threshold, and the higher one's partner's response threshold, the greater one's 
contributions to household tasks. Additionally, the lower one's response threshold, 
and the higher one's partner's response thresholds, the more likely the demand-
withdrawal pattern is to emerge in domestic labor conflicts. Finally, mutual 
avoidance is more likely when one partner perceives that it is less costly to 
complete domestic work than to engage in conflict about it, or when one partner 
perceives that domestic labor is not a worthwhile or appropriate conflict topic. 
Contributions of this investigation include support for the integrated theory of the 
division of domestic labor, increased understanding of how individual differences 
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(working in concert with actor sex) contribute to domestic labor allocation and 
conflict, a more sensitive measure of response threshold, and preliminary 
evidence of the "logics" of avoidance of domestic labor conflict. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Division of household labor is a critical issue in the lives of married and 
cohabitating couples. Dissatisfaction with the division of domestic labor is a 
frequent source of conflict for married and cohabitating dyads (Blair, 1993; 
Chethik, 2006; Kluwer, Heesink, & Van de Vliert, 1996; Perry-Jenkins & Folk, 
1994) and contributes to relational dissatisfaction, decreased marital happiness, 
and increased likelihood of divorce (Blair, 1998; Frisco & Williams, 2003; Pleck, 
1985; Suitor, 1991).  In one study, allocation of household work was the third 
most frequently-cited conflict topic for married couples, after money and 
childrearing (Chethik, 2006), although other research has found that division of 
labor conflicts occur more frequently than disagreements over childcare (Kluwer, 
Heesink, & Van de Vliert, 2000).  
Although the frequency of conflict concerning allocation of household 
labor is noteworthy, most conflict scholars agree that the mere presence of 
conflict in romantic relationships is not as consequential for relationship 
functioning as is the manner in which couples enact conflict (Gottman, 1979). 
Communicating negative affect, conflict denial/avoidance, and competitive 
conflict behaviors are harbingers or symptoms of relationship distress, while 
integrative communication and cooperative problem-solving are associated with 
positive relational outcomes (Bodenmann, Kaiser, Hahlweg, & Fehm-Wolfsdorf, 
1998; Eldridge & Christensen, 2002). More specifically, when couples’ 
disagreements over household labor are characterized by constructive problem-
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solving discussions and integrative conflict behaviors, their conflicts are 
associated with productive outcomes, such as an increase in mutual 
understanding, a clear compromise, and more equal sharing of household work 
(Kluwer, Heesink, & Van de Vliert, 1997; Weismann, Boeije, van Doorne-
Huiskes, & den Dulk, 2008). On the other hand, the use of distributive behaviors 
and demand/withdraw interactions are associated with destructive outcomes, such 
as unresolved problems and relationship disruption (Kluwer, et al., 1997; 
Weismann, et al., 2008). Finally, conflict avoidance also is associated with 
destructive outcomes and concessions by one partner alone, as when women cut 
back hours in paid work rather than engage in overt conflict (Weismann, et al., 
2008).  
Conflict over division of labor may be unavoidable since married and 
cohabitating couples often must attempt to reconcile two (perhaps greatly 
differing) visions of the way households are run (Clair, 2011). However, given 
that how couples manage their conflicts can result in either destructive or 
constructive outcomes, investigating the conditions under which domestic-labor-
related conflict occurs and how it is manifested offers insight into how couples 
can manage their disagreements over household labor more productively. 
 To the extent that conflict is derived from perceived incompatibility in 
activities and goals (Roloff & Soule, 2002), any factors that contribute to 
incompatibility in terms of household labor can be expected to contribute to 
domestic-labor-related conflict. One factor that has been alluded to in domestic-
labor conflict literature (see, for example, Pittman, Teng, Kerpelman, & Solheim, 
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1999; Thompson, 1991) but has yet to be subjected to systematic investigation, is 
the construct of response threshold (Alberts, Tracy, & Trethewey, 2011). A 
response threshold, in the realm of domestic labor, refers to the point at which the 
negative stimulus produced by a task undone motivates an individual to perform 
the task (in order to remove the stimulus). Discrepancies in married and 
cohabitating partners’ respective response thresholds have recently been offered 
as one explanation for how domestic labor is allocated (Alberts, et al., 2011).  
 Insofar as a response threshold represents one’s standards of cleanliness, 
discrepancy in the response thresholds of couple members may represent different 
ideas about what domestic tasks need to be done, how often, and how thoroughly 
(Alberts, et al., 2011; O'Colmain & Alberts, 2008). Such differences likely set the 
stage for conflict over domestic labor performance. Moreover, because the 
construct of response threshold contains a stimulus component, whereby one 
partner is more sensitive to or bothered by a task undone than the other, partners 
with highly discrepant thresholds are likely differentially invested in the 
allocation of household work, creating the conditions for particular conflict 
patterns (e.g., demand/withdraw). Prior empirical investigations of domestic labor 
in college roommates provide support for this view, showing that perceived 
differences in response thresholds predict conflict frequency (O'Colmain & 
Alberts, 2008; Riforgiate, 2011) as well as specific conflict communication 
behaviors (O’Colmain & Alberts, 2008).  
 The primary objective of the current research was to examine the effects 
of domestic partners’ response thresholds on the frequency and form of 
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heterosexual domestic partners’ division-of-labor-related conflict. Because 
response threshold is a nascent theoretical concept, a preliminary task of this 
research was to investigate the relationship between participant sex, response 
threshold, and task performance. Beyond that, this investigation extends previous 
research on domestic labor allocation and domestic labor conflict in five ways. 
First, it serves as the first test of the integrated theory among heterosexual 
romantic couples, the population for which the theory was articulated. Second, it 
employs marital dyads as the unit of analysis, which allows for consideration of 
the mutual influence of both spouses on division of labor and conflict. Third, it 
introduces a new, visual, measure of response threshold to complement verbal 
measures currently in use. Fourth, the present study contributes to ongoing 
scholarly debate about the demand/withdraw conflict pattern as a function of the 
structure of marriage (i.e., driven by the roles of wives and husbands) as well as 
the structure of a given conflict topic (i.e., driven by the role of complainer-
complainee). Finally, this study adds to our understanding of the nature of 
avoidance of domestic labor conflict by measuring and testing the perceived 
benefits of avoidance in this context.  
In the section that follows, I review predominant explanations for 
domestic labor inequities, and introduce the response threshold variable in the 
context of the integrative theory of division of domestic labor (Alberts, et al., 
2011). The effects of response threshold on domestic task performance, as 
suggested by the integrative theory, are offered. Subsequently, research on 
conflict interaction patterns generally, as well as within the context of division of 
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labor, is reviewed, and hypotheses about the role of response threshold in conflict 
patterns are advanced. Finally, this sections ends with a review of the research on 
t potential “reasons” for mutual avoidance of domestic labor conflict and 
hypotheses are posed in an attempt to provide empirical support for concepts 
introduced in previous literature.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Division of Domestic Labor 
 Much of the research on household division of labor has been devoted to 
explaining a persistent gender gap in labor performance. On average, women 
perform between two and three times as much household labor as their male 
partners (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; 2000; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007). 
Based on data collected in 2002, Fuwa and Cohen (2007) reported that in the 
United States, women perform about two-thirds of domestic work (not including 
childcare), averaging 13.2 hours a week to husbands’ 6.6 hours. Researchers also 
estimate that when both partners engage in full time paid work, women still 
contribute about 60% of unpaid domestic labor (Sullivan, 2000).  
Imbalances in household labor performance have a variety of effects on 
individuals. It has been well documented, for example, that women who are 
responsible for a large burden of domestic labor are less able to compete with men 
in the realm of paid work (MacDonald, Phipps, & Lethbridge, 2005), experience 
diminished earning potential (Drago, 2007; Polavieja, 2008; Williams, 2000) and 
are more likely to absent themselves temporarily or permanently from paid work 
(Hewlett & Luce, 2005; Stone, 2007). Moreover, for both men and women, the 
performance of certain domestic tasks – those that are repetitive and the 
scheduling of which performers have little control  – are associated with increased 
psychological distress (Barnett & Shen, 1997). 
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The effects of division of labor inequality on dyads are more complex.  
First, inequality does not always translate to perceived inequity. For example, 
despite the fact that wives in dual-earner couples perform the lion’s share of 
housework, only one-quarter to one-third feel that this is unfair (Barnett & 
Baruch, 1987; Pleck, 1985). Because of this fact, imbalances in labor performance 
do not automatically lead to relationship difficulties. It is not the mere presence of 
inequality that predicts discord and dissatisfaction, but rather the perception that 
the distribution of labor is unfair (Blair, 1993; Perry-Jenkins & Folk, 1994).   
Perceived inequity in division of labor is associated with a host of 
indicators of marital satisfaction. Wives are more satisfied in marriages in which 
they perceive that husbands do their fair share of work (Staines & Libby, 1986) 
and dissatisfied when they feel their husbands are doing too little (Pleck, 1985). 
Blair (1998) found that both spouses’ perceptions of unfairness in the division of 
domestic labor were positively associated with perceived likelihood of divorce, 
although Frisco and Williams (2003) found this association for wives only. Both 
spouses’ perceptions of unfairness in domestic labor allocation are directly related 
with the belief that the marriage is in trouble (Blair, 1993), and inversely related 
with ratings of marital happiness (Blair, 1998; Frisco & Williams, 2003). Finally, 
as is stated above, when one or both spouses are dissatisfied with the distribution 
of domestic labor, relational conflict occurs more frequently (Kluwer, et al., 1996, 
1997).  
Theoretical explanations for domestic labor allocation. Sociologists 
and gender scholars (e.g., Baxter, 2004; Bianchi, et al., 2000; Coltrane, 2000; 
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Cunningham, 2001), and more recently communication scholars (Alberts, et al., 
2011), have offered various frameworks for understanding and explaining 
domestic labor imbalances. Below I review two of the predominant explanations 
for the household labor allocation as well as outline key tenets of Alberts et al.’s 
(2011) integrated theory. 
 Relative resources. Relative resource theorists (e.g., Blood & Wolfe, 
1960) who focus on the division of domestic labor conceptualize domestic labor 
as an undesirable activity that household members attempt to avoid. According to 
this perspective, women do more household work because they have relatively 
fewer resources (in the form of paid income), and thus less bargaining power than 
their husbands. Husbands are able to leverage their relatively greater resources to 
“buy” themselves out of domestic tasks, whereas women are not (Hernandez, 
1990).  
 There has been mixed support for hypotheses derived from relative 
resource/ bargaining models. Support for this perspective has been found in that 
the larger the discrepancy among husbands’ and wives’ earnings, the larger the 
discrepancy in domestic labor contributions. Wives’ contributions to domestic 
labor tend to decrease as their earnings increase (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, 
& Matheson, 2003).  
However, certain patterns of earning and domestic labor performance 
within married households contradict the relative resource model. The theory 
implies that in households in which women out-earn their husbands, husbands 
will take on a greater burden of domestic work. To the contrary, in the same study 
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cited above, Bittman and colleagues (2003) found that wives’ contributions to 
domestic labor decreased with their increased earnings only up to the point at 
which their earnings equal their husbands’. When wives contribute more than half 
of household income, the balance tips back toward women performing more 
housework. In fact, the allocation of domestic labor when wives are sole 
breadwinners very closely resembles the arrangements when men are sole earners 
– in both cases, wives are doing the majority of the work (Bittman, et al., 2003). 
Moreover, Bittman et al.’s data showed that changes in housework allocation 
observed for differing contributions of household income were attributable to 
changes in women’s domestic labor performance: men’s performance of domestic 
labor is virtually unresponsive to changes in wives’ income. Using a U.S. sample, 
Brines (1994) found similar patterns, although she found that husbands’ domestic 
labor performance is affected by wives’ earnings, but in the opposite direction as 
expected. Brines reported that while wives decrease their average hours of 
housework as they earn more of the family income, husbands decrease their hours 
of housework at they become dependent on wives.  
Gender. Scholars have alternately attempted to explain housework 
allocation as a production or display of gender (West & Zimmerman, 1987). 
Scholars argue that the division of household labor provides an opportunity for 
men and women to enact normative modes of masculinity and femininity, with 
women performing housework and men abstaining from it (Hochschild, 1989; 
Natalier, 2003; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Hochschild (1989) found, for 
example, that men in dual-earner couples who perceived their wives’ employment 
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as a threat to their masculinity engaged in less housework, and wives increased 
their performance, as a way to neutralize gender “deviance” (Atkinson & Boles, 
1984)  in the partners’ participation in paid work. Brines (1994) also found that 
husbands in lower income households, and those who were unemployed due to 
job loss, performed less housework, presumably to preserve their masculine 
identities in situations in which the “provider” role was less available to them. 
However, gender ideology does not wholly account for sex differences in 
household labor performance. Even couples who espouse the most egalitarian 
values still have difficulty sharing tasks equally, and some do no better than 
couples espousing traditional values (Bittman & Pixley, 1997; Brayfield, 1992; 
Deutsch, 1999; DeVault, 1990).  
Integrative theory of division of domestic labor. Noting the inability of 
resource models and gender ideology to wholly account for divergent patterns of 
domestic labor performance among men and women, recent communication 
scholarship has conceptualized household division of labor as the product of an 
interactive system at work in the coupledom, comprised of individual, dyadic, and 
social factors (Alberts, et al., 2011). In their integrative theory of the division of 
domestic labor, Alberts and colleagues explain household work allocation as an 
interactive process whereby a given task comes to “belong to” one member of the 
couple. They posit that individual differences between couple members in 
responsiveness to domestic task need (i.e., response threshold), are reinforced and 
amplified via properties of the couple system, until particular domestic tasks are 
viewed as “belonging” to one member of the couple (Alberts, et al., 2011). The 
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theory suggests that this first happens when one partner has a lower response 
threshold for the task than the other (Alberts, et al., 2011).  
       A response threshold is defined as the point at which one is disturbed by a 
stimulus or, in the case of domestic labor, a task undone (Alberts, et al., 2011). 
The disturbance created when the threshold is reached motivates an individual to 
perform a task that will reduce the disturbance. To illustrate, if a person is 
disturbed by a trash can that is three-quarters full, the three-quarters mark could 
be thought of as that person’s threshold. When the garbage in the can reaches the 
three-quarters mark, the person will reach her or his threshold , and be motivated 
to reduce the disturbance (i.e., take out the garbage; Alberts et al. 2011).  
A threshold is an individual characteristic, which depends on features 
unique to that individual (e.g., his/her upbringing, his or her sensory sensitivity, 
his/her past experience with that task). To continue the example above, another 
individual may have a different threshold for garbage; he or she may not be 
disturbed until the garbage begins to emit a smell or is overflowing its container. 
That individual would be said to have a higher threshold than the first individual, 
as he or she requires more garbage to be present  before becoming disturbed 
(Alberts, et al., 2011). 
 Although one’s threshold for a particular task is predicted to influence 
one’s proclivity to perform that task, the theory claims that a single individual’s 
threshold alone does not determine how housework is allocated among two (or 
more) household members. Rather, Alberts et al. (2011) predict that a key factor 
is the difference between partners’ response thresholds for a particular task. 
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According to the integrative theory, the greater the difference between partners’ 
thresholds for a task, the greater the discrepancy in task performance (Alberts, et 
al., 2011). 
The threshold mechanism was first observed in the social behavior of ants 
and bees (Fewell, 2003). Individual ants, for example, have different thresholds 
regarding food levels in their colonies. Ants with lower thresholds for food 
storage are motivated to excavate food sooner than ants with higher thresholds, 
with important consequences. When a lower-threshold-possessing ant responds to 
the disturbance (i.e., collects more food), the stimulus for the task is reduced. 
Importantly, the stimulus is reduced before ever reaching the response threshold 
of a less reactive ant.  As a consequence, a higher-threshold-possessing ant is 
never disturbed by the level of food in the colony, and in turn is never motivated 
to excavate for food. Thusly, an ant with a lower threshold becomes a specialist in 
food excavation. In fact, if ants possessing highly discrepant response thresholds 
are paired, the ant with the lower threshold can die from the hazardous working 
conditions of excavation (Fewell, 2003). This process is referred to in systems 
theory as a feedback loop - whereby the performance of a behavior (in this case a 
task) by one individual in a system decreases the likelihood of another individual 
performing the same task - and results in divergence, whereby the behaviors of 
individuals in a system become increasingly dissimilar (Barabási, 2002; Camazine 
et al., 2001).  
 Bringing these findings to bear on the division of domestic labor among 
humans, Alberts et al. (2011) posit that differences in response thresholds for 
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domestic tasks operate over time to allocate those tasks to the individual with the 
lower threshold. To continue the example of the garbage can from above, if an 
individual has a lower threshold for garbage than her or his partner, not only 
would he/she be expected to take out the garbage sooner, but because this is done 
before the partner notices any disturbance it reduces the likelihood of the partner 
taking out the garbage in the future. 
 Although the similarities between ants’ and humans’ social network 
behavior provide the impetus for thinking of domestic labor in this way (Fewell, 
2003), the integrative theory of domestic labor also incorporates distinctly human 
capacities for meaning-making in explaining how domestic labor patterns become 
sedimented. Alberts et al. (2011) posit that a consequence of the divergent model 
of behavior caused by disparate thresholds is that partners sharing a domicile 
come to see a task as belonging to one individual or another based on precedent. 
Thus, even in cases where the stimulus for a task does reach the response 
threshold of the lower-threshold-possessing partner, he/she still may not complete 
the task (without being asked, anyway) because he/she does not perceive the task 
as his/her job.  This is consistent with observations about implicit dyadic-decision 
making, whereby a course of action, repeated uncontested, can develop into an 
“unarticulated relationship rule” (Sillars & Kalblesch, 1989, p. 183).  It is also 
consistent with findings in existing literature that the accomplishment of domestic 
labor arrangements is often perceived as “just happening” rather than as a product 
of explicit communication (Stone, 2007; Weismann, et al., 2008).  
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 A final consequence of the divergent behavioral pattern articulated in 
Alberts et al.’s (2011) theory is specialization by the lower-threshold possessing 
partner. Just at Fewell and other biological researchers described certain members 
of insect species as, for example, foraging specialists, so Alberts et al. predict that 
if an individual repeatedly performs a task before other household members reach 
their thresholds, that individual becomes a specialist in that task. The result is that 
one develops or bolsters his/her competency in the task while preventing others 
from developing the aptitude that comes with experience. This, in turn, may lead 
to further performance disparities to the extent that partners adhere to a pragmatic 
rule such as, “the person who is better at the task should complete it.” In a similar 
vein, it may also lead the specialist to maintain responsibility for a task rather than 
relinquishing it, so as to ensure that the task is completed to his/her standards.  
Alberts et al. (2011) argue that response thresholds help explain gendered 
patterns of domestic labor performance in heterosexual households. They 
hypothesize that women’s overperformance of household labor is at least partly 
attributable to their having lower thresholds for many household tasks. Women 
are believed to possess lower response thresholds for several reasons. First, 
women have a small biological advantage over men in terms of olfactory 
sensitivity (Doty, Applebaumk, Zushos, & Settle, 1985; Thuerauf et al., 2009). 
Second, sex differences in the thickness of, and specialized cells within, male and 
female retinas make women better able to detect color and texture (Sax, 2005), a 
characteristic that may give women an advantage in the perception of dust and 
disorder.  Finally, the socialization of the sexes (through explicit teaching and 
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general modeling of behavior) produces different competencies in males and 
females, and therefore increased attention to, and standards for, particular 
household tasks (Babcock & Laschever, 2003; Canary & Emmers-Sommer, 1997; 
Maccoby, 1990; West & Zimmerman, 1987).  
Previous research has provided support for the predictions of the 
integrated theory. Olgetree and Worthen (2008), for example, found that women 
have higher standards for levels of household cleanliness. Riforgiate (2011) 
demonstrated that college-aged women possessed a lower response threshold than 
college-aged men. Riforgiate also showed that among college students, possessing 
a lower response threshold relative to one’s roommate associated with performing 
a greater proportion of domestic labor.  
Riforgiate’s (2011) results show promise for the integrated theory. 
However, the tenets of the integrated theory of the division of domestic labor have 
yet to be subject to investigation among cross-sex romantic dyads. An objective 
of the present study is to test two of the key tenets of the theory –the association 
between threshold and performance, and the association between threshold and 
sex – among married couples. As such, four kinds of effects are hypothesized 
with regard to the integrative theory. First, actor effects are predicted, whereby 
individuals’ response thresholds are expected to influence their own performance 
of household labor. Second, partner effects are predicted, whereby individuals’ 
partners’ response thresholds are expected to influence individuals’ performance 
of household labor. Third, actor-by-partner interaction effects are predicted, 
whereby the relative threshold levels of both actors and partners are expected to 
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influence individuals’ performance of household labor. Finally, role effects are 
predicted, whereby marital role (husband vs. wife) is expected to influence 
response threshold, and labor performance, respectively. The following research 
question and hypotheses are offered:  
H1:    Wives report lower global response threshold levels than husbands.  
RQ1:  Do wives or husbands report lower response threshold levels for a) 
cleaning the bathroom, b) dusting, c) doing dishes, d) picking up 
clutter, e) taking out garbage, f) vacuuming, g) doing laundry, h) 
cleaning the kitchen, and i) making beds?  
H2:    Wives’ global response threshold levels associate negatively with 
wives’ performance of global domestic labor.  
H3:  Husbands’ global response threshold levels positively associate with 
wives’ performance of global domestic labor.  
H4:   Husbands’ and wives’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ performance of global domestic labor.  
H5:  Actors’ response threshold levels for each of the following tasks: a) 
cleaning the bathroom, b) making beds, c) picking up clutter, d) 
doing dishes, e) dusting, f) doing laundry, g) taking out garbage, h) 
cleaning kitchen surfaces, and i) vacuuming/sweeping; associate 
negatively with their performance of each task.  
H6:  Partners’ response threshold levels for each of the following tasks: a) 
cleaning the bathroom, b) making beds, c) picking up clutter, d) 
doing dishes, e) dusting, f) doing laundry, g) taking out garbage, h) 
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cleaning kitchen surfaces, and i) vacuuming/sweeping; associate 
positively with actors’ performance of each task.  
H7:  Actors’ and partners’ task-specific response threshold levels interact 
to predict actors’ performance of each task.  
Response Threshold as a Predictor of Domestic Labor Conflict 
 Conflict frequency. Response thresholds may also be useful in 
understanding and predicting conflict concerning the division of domestic labor. 
When two people form a marital household, a variety of factors influence their 
individual expectations about what cohabitating as spouses will entail, as well as 
their experience of sharing a home. If spouses have incompatible views about an 
aspect of living together (e.g., which color to paint the living room, whether to 
pay the mortgage by check or direct debit), conflict is by definition more likely to 
occur. Response thresholds represent one way of understanding spouses’ differing 
views on, and reactions to, levels of cleanliness in the home.  
 The more discrepant partners’ response thresholds, the more frequently 
division of labor conflicts are expected to arise. Partners with similar response 
thresholds can tolerate similar levels of mess and disorder (Alberts, et al., 2011). 
They require similar levels of mess before being disturbed and therefore are less 
likely to disagree about when and how domestic tasks should be performed 
(O'Colmain & Alberts, 2008; Riforgiate, 2011). Additionally, when messes are 
produced, partners with similar response thresholds are, by definition, likely to 
respond at about the same time, decreasing the likelihood that one partner will 
feel overworked.  The opposite is expected to the extent that partners have 
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dissimilar thresholds (i.e., when one partner has a low threshold and the other has 
a higher threshold). O’Colmain and Alberts (2008), in a study of college 
roommates, found that a greater degree of reported “sanitation superiority,” or the 
perception that one is more bothered by messes and has higher cleanliness 
standards that one’s housemate, was associated with greater conflict frequency. 
Similarly, Riforgiate (2011) found that individuals reported more frequent 
domestic labor conflict with their same-sex roommates to the extent that they 
perceived they and their roommate had discrepant response thresholds.   
 In the present study, I extend O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) and 
Riforgiate’s (2011) findings by examining the influence of response threshold on 
frequency of domestic labor conflict among a sample of married couples. This 
study also extends previous research by measuring each partners’ response 
threshold rather than a single partner’s assessment of the threshold discrepancy in 
the dyad. It is expected that dyad members’ response thresholds will interact, such 
that the greatest conflict frequency will occur when one partner has a relatively 
lower response threshold than the other. Thus, the following hypothesis is put 
forth: 
H8:  Actors’ and partners’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ reports of division of labor conflict. 
 Conflict behavior. In addition to predicting increased frequency of 
conflict, the relative response thresholds of marital partners likely also influence 
the specific behaviors manifested when they enact conflict. In this section, I 
discuss expected relationships among partners’ response thresholds and three 
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conflict patterns: mutually integrative communication, demand/withdraw, and 
mutual avoidance. 
 Integrative communication. Researchers have found that, as with other 
conflict topics, mutually integrative communication behaviors enacted during 
division of domestic labor conflict associate directly with productive outcomes, 
such as increased understanding and perception of compromise (Kluwer, et al., 
1997), as well as developing a clear-cut plan that leads to more equal sharing 
(Weismann, et al., 2008). Also, mutually integrative behaviors associate inversely 
with negative outcomes of division of domestic labor conflict, such as relationship 
disruption (Kluwer, et al., 1997), suggesting that mutually integrative 
communication during housework conflicts could stave off some of the adverse 
consequences of dissatisfaction with housework allocation. 
 Surprisingly little research has examined the preconditions associated with 
dyad members’ use of integrative behaviors in division of labor conflict, although 
Kluwer and colleagues (1997) found that a mutually integrative interaction pattern 
was more likely when couples reported relatively low levels of discontent with 
division of household labor. In the present study, I predict that when both dyad 
members’ report either high or low response thresholds, integrative conflict 
behaviors are more likely. Integrative communication in conflict reflects a 
concern for both oneself and one’s partner and reflects engagement in the conflict 
issue (Ohbuchi & Tedeschi, 1997; Sillars, 1980). Partners who have similarly 
high or low thresholds have more common ground to stand on in conflict 
discussions: there is more agreement on the importance (high or low) of 
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housework, and partners are more equally invested in the outcome of the 
discussion because they are similarly bothered by tasks undone. This is consistent 
with the finding by O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) that reported use of mutually 
integrative communication was related negatively to discrepancies in college 
roommates’ mess thresholds and cleanliness preferences. Based on this reasoning, 
I put forth the following hypothesis 
H9:  Actors’ and partners’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ reports of mutually integrative division of labor 
conflict. 
 Demand/withdraw. The demand/withdraw pattern is the most commonly 
studied form of specific conflict communication with regard to division of 
household labor (Eldridge & Christensen, 2002). Demand/withdraw is 
characterized by asymmetry in partners’ behavior: one spouse or partner 
criticizes, attempts to engage the other, or persuade the other to change, while the 
other partner becomes defensive, psychologically disengages, or even physically 
withdraws from the conflict (Christensen, 1987; Sullaway & Christensen, 1983; 
Wile, 1981). The issue that has predominated much of demand/withdraw research 
concerns which partner is playing the role of demander and which partner is 
playing the role of withdrawer at a given time.  
 When initially introduced in the conflict literature, the demand/withdraw 
pattern was primarily conceptualized as wife-demand/husband-withdraw, with 
husbands reporting that a critical issue in their marriage was a “nagging wife,” 
and wives reporting a complementary problem of a withdrawn husband (Ternan, 
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Buttenweiser, Ferguson, Johnson, & Wilson, 1938). Research since that time has 
generally found that wife-demand/husband-withdraw occurs more frequently than 
husband-demand/wife-withdraw (Christensen, 1987, 1988; Christensen & 
Heavey, 1990; Eldridge, Sevier, Jones, Atkins, & Christensen, 2007), excepting 
Papp and colleagues, (2009).  A variety of explanations have been offered for the 
observed sex differences in demanding and withdrawing behaviors in relationship 
conflict, including differences in the socialization of men and women in the 
experience of closeness (Christensen, 1987, 1988), sex-differentiated 
physiological reactivity to conflict-induced stress (Gottman & Levenson, 1986, 
1988), and the influence of personality variables such as femininity (Walczynski, 
1997). A complete review is available from Eldridge and Christenson (2002). 
 Additionally, scholars have pointed to structural features of society, in 
heterosexual marriages, and within conflict discussions to explain sex-
differentiated demand/withdraw patterns. Generally, structural explanations 
converge on the idea that demanding behavior in conflict corresponds to a desire 
to change some feature of the partner or the relationship, and that withdrawal is 
motivated by a desire to avoid change (i.e., maintain the status quo). From a broad 
social structural perspective, the female-demand/male-withdrawal pattern is 
expected as men, in an effort to maintain the greater status and benefits conferred 
to them in society, deflect women’s attempts at change (Noller, 1993; Peplau & 
Gordon, 1985). Similarly, researchers who focus on the structure of the marriage 
relationship argue that men incur more benefits than women in the traditional 
marriage arrangement and, thus, wives are likely to desire change in more areas of 
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the marriage and initiate discussions to achieve change (Jacobson, 1989, 1990). 
Men, by contrast, “have a lot to lose but nothing to gain by discussing relationship 
problems” (Eldridge & Christensen, 2002, p. 305), and so they avoid or withdraw 
from discussions that might alter the status quo.  
 Another variant of structural explanations centers on explaining the 
conditions under which either wife-demand/husband-withdraw or husband-
demand/wife-withdraw occurs. This perspective addresses an implication of 
structural approaches that, if women demand more because they more often want 
to change the status quo, men are likely to engage in demanding behavior when 
they are in the role of complainer or change seeker. Heavey and colleagues (1993) 
hypothesized an effect of the conflict structure such that in conflict discussions in 
which the wife desires change, wife-demand/husband-withdraw is more likely, 
whereas in conflicts over topics for which the husband desires change, husband-
demand/wife-demand is more likely.   
 Tests of the conflict structure hypothesis have yielded support for the 
importance of conflict topic (or more specifically, who raises a topic), in 
predicting demand/withdraw patterns. In conflicts that center on a topic raised by 
wives (i.e., desiring change in husbands), wife-demand/husband-withdraw is more 
likely than husband-demand/wife-withdraw. However, for conflict discussions of 
a topic raised by husbands (i.e., desiring change in wives), there is no significant 
difference in the likelihood of the two patterns (Christensen & Heavey, 1990; 
Eldridge & Christensen, 2002; Eldridge, et al., 2007; Heavey, et al., 1993; 
Walczynski, 1997).  These findings suggest that both sex and topic effects operate 
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to produce demand/withdraw patterns. The researchers concluded that women 
generally have a propensity toward the demanding role, and men toward the 
withdrawing role, in conflict discussions, but conflict topic operates to enhance 
(for wives’ topics) or attenuate (for husbands’ topics) that pattern (Heavey, et al., 
1993). Other research has shown a complete reversal of the demand/withdraw 
pattern based on topic, whereby wife-initiated topics are more likely to produce 
wife-demand/husband-withdraw and husband-initiated topics are more likely to 
produce husband-withdraw/wife-demand (Holtzworth-Munroe, Smutzler, & 
Stuart, 1998; Klinetob & Smith, 1996; Papp, et al., 2009).  
 More research is being done to determine the conditions under which 
complete role reversal is most likely. For example, Eldridge and colleagues 
(2000; Eldridge, et al., 2007) found that interaction patterns among non-distressed 
or low-level distressed couples more closely approximate complete role reversal 
based on topic-initiator than do patterns observed in highly distressed couples. 
That is, more-distressed couples display more rigidity in the wife-demanding and 
husband-withdraw pattern. Nevertheless, generally speaking, for husband-
initiated topics (i.e., when husbands want to change the status quo), husbands are 
at least as likely as wives to engage in demanding behavior, and wives are at least 
as likely as husbands to withdraw (Eldridge & Christensen, 2002).  
 Response thresholds and demand/withdrawal patterns. Given what is 
known about the importance of the role of change seeker in demand/withdrawal 
patterns, it is expected that response threshold will influence the presence and 
structure of demand/withdraw division of labor conflict. First, it is expected that 
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demanding behavior is more likely among individuals with relatively lower 
response thresholds. Relatively low-threshold-possessing individuals are believed 
to be overburdened with domestic labor performance, and thus are more likely to 
desire change in domestic labor allocations. By contrast, relatively high-
threshold-possessing individuals are more likely to want to maintain the status 
quo (O'Colmain & Alberts, 2008), and thus withdrawing behavior is more likely 
among these individuals. Finally, the effects of both partners’ response thresholds 
are expected to interact such that more demand/withdrawal is expected with larger 
discrepancies in partners’ response thresholds. O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) 
found that dissimilarity in mess thresholds and cleanliness standards predicted 
greater use of the demand/withdraw pattern among college roommates. The lower 
one’s response threshold in relation to one’s partner, the more housework an 
individual is likely to take on relative to his/her partner, and thus, the more he/she 
will attempt to enlist the partner’s help or cooperation through conflict.  
Additionally, the more discrepant partners’ response thresholds, the more 
unequally invested they are in engaging in conflict over domestic labor 
allocations. The lower-threshold-possessing partner, by virtue of being more 
disturbed by tasks undone, is more invested in a solution and dependent on the 
partner’s cooperation to achieve that solution (Kluwer, et al., 1997). The higher-
threshold-possessing partner, by contrast, cares less about the messes or undone 
tasks in question, can achieve his/her goal unilaterally (Kluwer, et al., 1997), and 
therefore may feel the conflict is not worth pursuing.  
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 Research by Kluwer et al. (1997) supports this assertion. These 
researchers found an interaction between wives’ and husbands’ discontent with 
division of labor arrangements on demand/withdraw conflict patterns such that 
wives’ discontent was a stronger predictor of wife-demand/husband-withdraw 
when husbands reported low levels of discontent.  In some cases, 
demand/withdraw may also take the form of criticism by the lower-threshold-
possessing individual of the quality of task performance produced by the higher-
threshold-possessing individual. Weismann et al. (2008) found that women’s 
criticism of men’s performance of certain household tasks led some men to 
withdraw, leaving women to tend to the tasks themselves. Whatever the specific 
mechanism at work, each partner’s response threshold, and the interaction 
between the two, are expected to predict demand/withdraw division of labor 
conflict. Given that dyads are the unit of analysis for this study, two forms of 
demand/withdraw are examined: actor-demand/partner-withdrawal (actors reports 
of a conflict pattern whereby they demand and their partner withdraws), and 
partner-demand/partner-withdrawal (actors reports of a conflict pattern whereby 
their partner demands and they withdraw). Specifically: 
H10: Actors’ global response threshold levels associate negatively with 
their reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal during division of 
labor conflict.  
H11: Partners’ global response threshold levels associate positively with 
actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal during division 
of labor conflict.  
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H12:  Actors’ and partners’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal during 
division of labor conflict.  
H13: Actors’ global response threshold levels associate positively with 
their reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal during division of 
labor conflict.  
H14: Partners’ global response threshold levels associate negatively with 
actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal during division 
of labor conflict.  
H15:  Actors’ and partners’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal during 
division of labor conflict.  
 Response thresholds, role, and demand/withdrawal patterns. As noted 
above, some studies of demand/withdraw communication have found a complete 
role reversal in the demand/withdraw pattern, such that each sex demands when 
discussing a topic on which they desire change (Holtzworth-Munroe, et al., 1998; 
Klinetob & Smith, 1996). Other researchers have found a remaining influence of 
sex, even when varying topic-initiator, such that wife-demand/husband-withdraw 
is more likely for wives’ topics, but wife-demand/husband-withdraw and 
husband-demand/wife-withdraw are not statistically significantly different for 
husbands’ topics (e.g., Heavey, et al., 1993).  
 Kluwer and colleagues (2000) obtained results similar to the latter pattern 
in a scenario study. Participants rated wife-demand/husband-withdraw as more 
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likely than husband-demand/wife-withdraw, but only when the wife desired an 
increase in her spouse’s domestic labor performance while her husband was 
satisfied with the status quo. When judging scenarios in which the husband 
desired an increase in his spouse’s domestic labor performance but the wife was 
satisfied with the status quo, there was no significant difference in perceived 
likelihood of husband-demand/wife-withdraw and wife-demand/husband-
withdraw (Kluwer, et al., 2000).  Thus for domestic labor conflicts, there may be 
an influence of sex as well as desire-for-change/desire-for-status-quo on the roles 
taken in demand/withdraw patterns. For that reason, I propose the following 
research questions assessing interactions between sex (husbands vs. wives) and 
response threshold levels: 
RQ2: Does role (husbands vs. wives) interact with actors’ response 
threshold levels to predict actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-
withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
RQ3: Does role (husbands vs. wives) interact with partners’ response 
threshold levels to predict actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-
withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
RQ4: Do role (husbands vs. wives), actor response threshold level, and 
partner response threshold interact to predict actors’ reports of 
actor-demand/partner-withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
RQ5: Does role (husbands vs. wives) interact with actors’ response 
threshold levels to predict actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-
withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
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RQ6: Does role (husbands vs. wives) interact with partners’ response 
threshold levels to predict actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-
withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
RQ7: Do role (husbands vs. wives), actor response threshold level, and 
partner response threshold interact to predict actors’ reports of 
partner-demand/actor-withdraw during division of labor conflict?  
 Avoidance. As with the demand/withdraw conflict pattern, mutually 
avoidant behaviors in division of labor conflicts associate with destructive conflict 
outcomes (Kluwer, et al., 1997) and lack of change. Despite the apparent 
ineffectiveness of avoiding division of labor conflicts, research shows that it is 
fairly common, particularly when overperformers (most often women) feel that 
the costs of engaging in conflict exceed the costs of continuing to carry a greater 
burden of domestic work (Johnson & Huston, 1998; Kluwer, et al., 1997; Pleck, 
1985; Thompson, 1991).  
O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) found that larger differences in mess 
thresholds and cleanliness standards were positively related to reported use of 
mutually avoidant conflict behavior in college roommates. In a way, this seems to 
contradict their previously cited finding that the demand/withdraw pattern was 
more likely among roommates with more discrepant thresholds. Their findings 
suggest that when partners have different response thresholds, there is an 
increased tendency for both partners to avoid, as well as an increased tendency for 
one partner to pursue and one to withdraw (a behavior similar to avoidance). 
What accounts for these dual, partially contradictory, patterns? One possible 
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explanation is that among cases in which one partner has a relatively low 
threshold and the other has a relatively high threshold, sometimes the lower-
threshold possessing partner has reason to believe that avoidance is a more 
effective strategy than constructive or demanding communication. There are 
many potential reasons why an individual might make such a judgment (e.g., 
questions about the legitimacy of the complaint, ineffective previous conflicts, 
perception that the partner is unwilling to change, etc.). Whatever the reason, a 
lower-threshold-possessing partner may feel it is less costly to simply perform the 
labor work him/herself rather than try to persuade the partner to change or 
contribute.  
Weismann et al. (2008) observed this pattern among dual earner couples – 
some wives exhibited stoicism in the face of dissatisfaction with division of 
domestic labor. These wives avoided division of labor conflicts, instead reducing 
their hours in paid work to compensate for the extra labor they were allocated at 
home. This reflected a view among couples that the division of household labor 
was “not worth mentioning” (Weismann, et al., 2008, p. 358). Many of the wives 
in the study who avoided division of labor conflict also attributed their avoidance 
to differing standards between spouses for the performance of household labor. 
Some wives acknowledged that because they wanted household labor performed a 
“certain way,” they chose not to pursue contributions from husbands.  Implied in 
these descriptions is a choice between asking for help that may be substandard 
and simply completing the tasks themselves, sometimes resentfully. It may be, 
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therefore, that stoicism results when individuals perceive that avoidance is more 
beneficial than engaging in conflict.   
 Taken together, O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) and Weisman et al.’s 
(2008) research suggest two possible patterns: First, lower-threshold possessing 
individuals with higher-threshold possessing partners are more likely to avoid 
division of labor conflict. Second, avoidance (as opposed to making demands or 
engaging constructively) may depend on a perception by the lower-threshold 
possessing individual that avoiding conflict confers some benefit. Thus, the 
following hypothesis and research question are put forth: 
H16:  Actors’ and partners’ global response threshold levels interact to 
predict actors’ reports of mutual avoidance during division of labor 
conflict.  
RQ8: Do actors’ and partners’ global response thresholds, as well as 
actors’ perceived benefits of avoidance, interact to predict actors’ 
reports of mutual avoidance during division of labor conflict?   
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Chapter 3 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Data were collected using a social networking sample. Undergraduate 
students in a Communication department at a large university in the southwestern 
United States were asked to recruit one heterosexual married couple to complete a 
web survey. Students were offered extra credit in a Communication course in 
exchange for recruiting a couple to the study. On each of the surveys, participants 
were asked to provide a telephone number that would not be connected to 
responses, but would be used to verify participation. Following the completion of 
data collection, an undergraduate research assistant contacted 20% of respondents 
at random, and successfully verified participation.   
 Participants were 155 heterosexual married couples. Dyads had been 
married an average of 19.98 years (SD = 9.99), and the vast majority of dyads (n 
= 116) were reporting on their first marriage. Male participants’ age ranged from 
22 to 77 years, with a mean age of 49.69 years (SD =9.73). Female participants’ 
age ranged from 20 to 69 years, with a mean age of 46.92 years (SD = 8.84).  
Collectively, 3.3% of this sample identified as Asian, 3.9% as Black or African 
American, 2.6% as Latino or Hispanic, 85.6% as White or European American, 
4.6% as other or more than one category.  Among males, 83.9% were employed 
full time and 3.9% were employed part time. Among females, 49.0% were 
employed full time and 20.6% were employed part time. 
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Measures 
Response threshold. Three self-report measures were used to assess 
response threshold. The first was the disorder tolerance measure, a 7–item scale 
initially developed by O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) and later revised by 
Riforgiate (2008). The disorder tolerance measure includes a list of common 
household tasks (i.e., cleaning the bathroom, dusting, doing the dishes, picking up 
clutter, taking out the garbage, vacuuming) and asks participants to indicate the 
degree to which they would be bothered (1= not bothered at all; 7 = extremely 
bothered) if a task was left undone.  The disorder tolerance measure also includes 
a global stem (“In general, how would you rate the degree to which undone 
household tasks bother you?”), with the same response options as above. Previous 
use of the measure has determined that the items in the disorder tolerance measure 
load on a single factor and the scale has obtained a Cronbach’s alpha estimate of 
internal reliability between .81 and .91 (Afifi, et al., 2008; O'Colmain & Alberts, 
2008). For the present study, the disorder tolerance measure was expanded to 
include three additional tasks: doing laundry, cleaning the kitchen, and making 
beds. Cronbach’s alpha for the revised scale was .93. 
The disorder tolerance measure assesses the degree to which an unkempt 
living space is disturbing to an individual. This is appropriate in that the measure 
likely assesses a dimension reflected in the construct of response threshold, that of 
cleanliness standards or preferences. The more bothered one is by a stimulus, the 
more incentive there is expected to be to complete an action that reduces the 
stimulus. However, the disorder tolerance measure does not directly connect the 
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perception of a disturbance to a propensity to attend to the task, as is implied by 
the theoretical definition of the response threshold construct. Therefore, two 
additional measures of response threshold were developed to assess the point at 
which a mess is bothersome enough to an individual to motivate him/her to attend 
to the task. Specifically, these forms of measurement present participants with 
photographs of task-specific “messes” (e.g., an overflowing trash can) and ask 
participants to indicate whether, or the point at which, they would be motivated to 
attend to the mess.  
In the gradated response threshold measure, participants viewed a series 
of photographs depicting successively “messier” conditions, and were asked to 
indicate whether, on a typical day, they would be “bothered enough to take care of 
the task” (1 = Definitely not; 4 = Definitely would).   
In the snapshot response threshold measure, participants were shown a 
single moderately “messy” photograph for each task, and asked to rate their 
response on a 5-point scale (e.g., 1 = I would be bothered enough to clean the 
bathroom long before it got to this point; 5 = I would not be bothered enough to 
clean the bathroom until long after this point).   
Domestic labor performance. Previous conceptualizations of domestic 
labor have varied in the extent to which they include indoor as well as outdoor 
tasks, stereotypically male versus female tasks, childcare and emotional labor . 
Following Alberts et al., (2011), in this study, domestic labor was conceptualized 
as indoor and outdoor housework tasks, excluding items solely related to 
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children’s need. For example, laundry was included, but reading to children was 
not. 
 Domestic labor performance has also been conceptualized in a variety of 
ways. Researchers have alternately studied domestic labor performance as a 
proportion or percentage of time spent by both members of a couple (Barnett & 
Shen, 1997; Blair & Lichter, 1991), as absolute time spent in an average week 
(Barnett & Shen, 1997; Bianchi, et al., 2000), and by allocation (i.e., how often 
each member of the household completes various tasks; Mederer, 1993). 
 For the present study, task-specific domestic labor performance was 
conceptualized in terms of how often an individual completes a task relative to 
his/her partner. Following Mederer (1993), this was measured by asking 
participants to indicate whether, under normal circumstances, they or their partner 
complete each task (1= My partner always does; 7 = I always do)
1
. Global 
domestic labor performance was conceptualized as the proportion of total 
household work tasks a respondent contributes in an average week.  Following 
Barnet and Shen (1997), participants were asked to indicate the minutes per week 
they spend in each task in an average week
2
. For each dyad, a score for total 
                                            
1 Participants were instructed to select “not applicable” if a task is not performed 
in their home or if someone other than themselves or their partner completes the 
task. 
 
2 Barnett and Shen (1997) created an estimate of each individual’s time 
spent in domestic labor by averaging an individual’s and his/her partner’s 
estimates of that individual’s contribution. They took this approach to try to 
correct reporting bias. However, I elected to use only the actor’s reports of 
their time spent in each task. This is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinning of this study: if an individual has a particularly high threshold 
for a task, he/she may not even notice that a task has been completed, let 
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minutes spent in each task was computed. An individual’s proportion of time in 
each task was determined by dividing his/her minutes in that task by the minutes 
spent in that task for the dyad. Example: 
Actor proportion of laundry  =          Actor’s minutes doing laundry    
                                    Actor’s minutes + Partner’s minutes  
       doing laundry        doing laundry 
The global estimate was computed by averaging the proportions across the nine 
household tasks.  
Conflict behavior. This study employed self-report assessment techniques 
to measure conflict behaviors. One advantage of self-report techniques over 
laboratory observations when studying conflict patterns is that certain interaction 
patterns of interest, such as demand/withdraw, are not as likely to occur when 
couples have been explicitly instructed to discuss an issue (Eldridge & 
Christensen, 2002). Although more subtle withdrawal behaviors, such as topic 
changes, are observable, a laboratory setting is not conducive to detecting more 
extreme withdrawal such as silence or leaving the room (Eldridge & Christensen, 
2002).  
Dyadic conflict behavior was measured using an adapted version of the 
Communication Patterns Questionnaire-short form (CPQ-SF; Christensen & 
Heavey, 1990; Heavey, et al., 1993). The CPQ-SF assesses spouses’ perceptions 
of marital interactions when an issue or problem arises and during discussions of 
issues and problems.  
                                                                                                                       
alone be able to accurately estimate the amount of time his/her partner 
spent in that task. 
 
  36 
The CPQ-SF has been used in nearly two dozen studies, and has 
demonstrated moderate to high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α ranges from 
.50 to .85), and convergent validity with a measure of dyadic adjustment (Futris, 
Campbell, Nielson, & Burwell, 2010). Despite the frequent use of the CPQ-SF, no 
study to date has examined consistencies between partner- and self-report data for 
the CPQ-SF (Futris, et al., 2010). However, studies have demonstrated 
consistency between partner-report, self-report, and observational ratings for the 
communication patterns questionnaire (CPQ; Bodenmann, et al., 1998; 
Christensen, 1988; Hahlweg, Kaiser, Christensen, Fehm-Wolfsdorf, & Groth, 
2000), of which the CPQ-SF is a condensed form. Additional items to measure 
avoidance were added to the CPQ-SF (i.e., “I don’t bring up the issue,” “I don’t 
initiate a discussion,”  “I don’t talk about the problem.”). The 14 items of the 
revised CPQ-SF were submitted to a principal components analysis with varimax 
rotation. Criteria for determining components were (1) Kaiser’s criterion of an 
eigenvalue of 1 or greater, (2) at least two items per component, (3) primarily 
loadings of .60 or greater and secondary loadings less than .40, and (4) conceptual 
coherence among items forming each component. Two of the 16 initial items that 
did not meet these criteria were dropped from the analysis, which was then rerun. 
The final 4-component solution accounted for 74.75% of the variance. The first 
component (variance = 21.33%, loadings = .82 to .85) contained four items 
reflecting an actor-demand/partner-withdraw subscale. The second component 
(variance = 21.32%, loadings = .79 to .86) contained four items reflecting a 
partner-demand/actor-withdraw subscale. The third component (variance = 
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16.85%, loadings = .81 to .87) contained three items reflecting a mutually 
constructive subscale. The fourth component (variance = 15.25%, loadings = .72 
to .87) contained three items reflecting a mutual avoidance subscale (see Table 1-
5). 
Perceived benefits of avoidance. Perceived benefits of avoidance of 
domestic labor conflict was measured using an 8-item scale developed for this 
study. As this scale had not been used previously, a principal components analysis 
with varimax rotation was conducted to determine how the items grouped into 
components. Criteria for determining components were: (1) Kaiser’s criterion of 
an eigenvalue of 1 or greater; (2) at least two items per component; (3) primarily 
loadings of .60 or greater and secondary loadings less than .40; and (4) conceptual 
coherence among items forming each component. One of nine initial items that 
did not meet these criteria was dropped from the analysis, which was then rerun. 
The final 3-component solution accounted for 67.28% of the variance. The first 
component (variance = 25.62%, loadings = .68 to .84) contained three items 
reflecting a perception that it is easier to simply do the work than ask for help 
(i.e., easier to do it myself). The second component (variance = 21.64%, loadings 
= .83) contained two items reflecting a perception that engaging in conflict won’t 
improve the situation (i.e., not going to improve). Finally, the third component 
(variance = 20.01%, loadings = .66 to .81) contained three items reflecting a 
perception that it is not appropriate to engage in conflict over household labor 
(i.e., not worth fighting about; see Tables 6-9). 
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Chapter 4 
RESULTS 
Tests of Nonindependence 
Given that marital dyads were the focus of this investigation, the first 
analytical task was to determine whether the data should be treated as dyadic, 
using couple as the unit of analysis, or as independent, using individual as the unit 
of analysis. Data in which dyad members are linked, or nonindependent, require 
different analytical procedures than data in which individuals are independent. 
Treating nonindependence dyadic data as independent violates the assumptions of 
traditional statistical procedures and runs the risk of inflating Type I and Type II 
error rates (Kenny, Kashy, & Cook, 2006) 
 For dyads in which members are distinguishable (e.g., husband and wife), 
Kenny, Kashy, and Cook (2006) recommend assessing nonindependence by 
computing Pearson product-moment correlations among dyad members’ scores on 
the dependent variable(s).  Kenny and colleagues (2006), following others (e.g., 
Myers, 1979), also recommend using a liberal test for nonindependence by 
selecting a two-tailed alpha value of .20.  This suggestion derives from the 
observation that in order to adequately power (power = 80%) a test of 
nonindependence using a traditional alpha level (two-tailed alpha = .05), a sample 
of 753 dyads would be required to detect a small effect. Given that dyadic data is 
often relatively difficult to obtain, Kenny and colleagues recommend using a 
liberal test of nonindependence when a study lacks a very large sample. 
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Table 10 summarizes the Pearson correlations actors’ and partners’ 
dependent variables in this study, along with their means and standard deviations. 
For all but one of the dependent variables, dyad members’ scores are significantly 
correlated at the .20 level. Thus, dyad is treated as the unit of analysis for this 
study. 
Dyadic Analyses 
 This study employs three separate approaches to dyadic data analysis: 
structural equation modeling, repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA), and actor-partner-interdependence models using multilevel 
modeling.  
Repeated measures MANOVA. The primary purpose of repeated 
measures analyses for dyadic data is to test for differences between dyad 
members. In repeated measures MANOVA, multiple dependent variables that are 
thought to be correlated are predicted on the basis of the repeated-measures 
factor. Whereas in traditional repeated measures MANOVA, the repeated 
measures factor represents multiple measures from one individual (e.g., across 
time periods, or across multiple instruments), for dyadic analysis, the repeated 
factor represents the two data points from the dyad corresponding to each member 
of the couple. The repeated measures MANOVA produces a multivariate test and 
overall model effect size in addition to the univariate tests of the separate 
dependent variables (Kenny, et al., 2006). In this study, repeated measures 
MANOVA is employed to test for differences between husbands and wives on 
global and task-specific response thresholds. 
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Structural equation modeling. Structural equation modeling (SEM) is a 
very useful, and in some circles, preferred method of analyzing dyadic data 
(Kenny, et al., 2006; Wendorf, 2002). SEM is unique in that it allows the research 
to conduct analyses employing latent (unobserved) variables which are modeled 
as a function of two or more observed variables. Structural equation models 
account for nonindependence in dyad members’ scores by allowing the error 
terms of the exogenous variables to be correlated. For this study, a single 
structural equation model was estimated to examine influence of global response 
thresholds on domestic labor allocation.  
 The actor-partner-interdependence-model using multilevel modeling. 
The majority of the hypotheses and research questions in this investigation will be 
evaluated via a series of actor-partner-interdependence models using multilevel 
modeling. The APIM is a highly versatile procedure for dyadic analysis. First, the 
APIM allows for the simultaneous estimation of actor, partner, and role (e.g., 
male vs. female) effects, and MLM allows the researcher to estimate these effects 
while controlling for nonindependence in dyad members’ scores.  Actor effects 
refer to the influence of one individual’s score on a predictor variable on his/her 
own score on the dependent variable (e.g., how does one’s response threshold 
affect one’s own conflict behavior). Partner effects refer to the influence of one’s 
partner’s score on one’s own score on the dependent variable (e.g, how one’s 
spouse’s response threshold affects one’s own conflict behavior). The APIM can 
also be used to estimate role effects (e.g., husband vs. wife) when roles are 
distinguishable (e.g., do husbands or wives have lower response thresholds).  
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Second, the APIM allows for the analysis of mixed variables. Most MLM 
techniques allow for the analysis of between-dyads variables (i.e., those for which 
both members of a dyad have the same score, such as length of marriage) and 
within-dyad variables (i.e., those for which scores differ across dyad members but 
each dyad has the same average score, such as sex for cross-sex dyads). The 
APIM allows for the analysis of mixed variables, in which scores vary both 
between-and within-dyads (i.e., scores vary between partners but scores of dyad 
members are more similar than the scores of two randomly matched participants; 
Kenny, et al., 2006). One drawback to using MLM is that the APIM can only be 
used to predict one dependent variable at a time. Therefore, for this investigation, 
which includes three measures of the dependent variable response threshold, 
multiple actor-partner-interdependence-models must be estimated for each 
hypothesis or research question.  
For each of the hypotheses employing the APIM, preliminary analysis 
were conducted to screen for two-way (e.g., actor by sex) and three-way (e.g., 
actor by partner by sex) interactions.  Non-significant higher-order interactions 
were removed and models were re-run as hypothesized.  Significant interactions 
were interpreted by plotting simple slopes using an Excel program developed by 
Dawson (2012) in accordance with methods suggested by Aiken and West (1991) 
and Dawson and Richter (2006). The Excel program uses standardized estimates 
for independent variables, moderators, and intercepts to compute simple slopes. 
Following Kenny et al.’s (2006) recommendation, all predictor variables were 
centered at the grand mean prior to conducting analyses. Finally, all APIM 
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analyses included actors’ and partners’ weekly hours spent in paid work as a 
covariate, to account for the fact that this sample includes both dual-earner and 
traditional couples.  
Sex Differences in Response Threshold 
Global response threshold. Hypothesis 1 predicted that wives would 
report lower global response threshold levels than husbands. A repeated measures 
MANOVA was conducted to test H1, with three measures of global response 
threshold (i.e., gradated response threshold measure, snapshot response threshold 
measure, and disorder tolerance measure) as the composite dependent variable, 
and role (husbands vs. wives) as the independent variable. Correlations between 
the dependent variables (i.e., the three measures of global response threshold) 
ranged from .36 to .84, with Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2(5) = 409.75, p < .001, 
confirming the appropriateness of treating the three measures of global response 
threshold as a composite in a multivariate analysis. The results of the MANOVA 
indicated that men’s and women’s reports of global response threshold differed 
significantly, F(3, 152) = 7.12, p < .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .88, with role 
accounting for 12% of the variance in the composite measure of global response 
threshold. The accompanying univariate tests revealed that women reported lower 
global response thresholds than men across the three response threshold measures: 
gradated response threshold, F(1, 154) = 19.86, p < .001, partial η2 = .11;  
snapshot response threshold, F(1, 154) = 7.70, p = .006, partial η2 = .05; and 
disorder tolerance measure, F(1, 154) = 8.88, p = .003, partial η2 = .06. Thus, H1 
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was supported. Women reported lower global tolerance for household disorder 
than men for all measures in this study (see Table 11). 
Task-specific response threshold. RQ1 asked whether wives or husbands 
would report lower response threshold levels for a) cleaning the bathroom, b) 
making beds, c) clearing clutter, d) cleaning dishes, d) dusting, e) doing laundry, 
f) cleaning kitchen surfaces, g) taking out garbage, and f) vacuuming/sweeping 
floors.  To assess RQ1, three separate repeated measures MANOVAs were 
conducted corresponding to the three measures of response threshold. A 
MANOVA was estimated to examine role differences in the six tasks measured 
using the gradated response threshold measure. Correlations between husbands’ 
and wives’ task-specific response thresholds as measured by the gradated 
response threshold measure ranged from .19 to .41, with Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, χ2(20) = 459.38, p < .001, confirming the appropriateness of 
examining the six tasks together in a multivariate analysis. The results of the 
MANOVA indicated that men’s and women’s reports of task-specific response 
threshold differed significantly, F(6,149) = 4.54, p < .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .85, 
with role accounting for 15% of the variance in the group of task-specific 
response thresholds. The accompanying univariate tests revealed that wives 
reported lower global response thresholds than husbands for laundry, bed making, 
bathroom cleaning, cleaning dishes, and clearing clutter (Significant univariate 
effects means, and standard deviations, for all three measures are reported in 
Table 11). 
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 A MANOVA was also estimated to examine role differences in the six 
tasks measured using the snapshot response threshold measure. Correlations 
between husbands’ and wives’ task-specific response thresholds as measured by 
the snapshot response threshold measure ranged from .06 to .43, with Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity, χ2(20) = 234.14, p < .001, confirming the appropriateness of 
examining the six tasks together in a multivariate analysis. The results of the 
MANOVA indicated that men’s and women’s reports of task-specific response 
threshold differed significantly, F(6,154) = 4.11, p = .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .85, 
with role accounting for 15% of the variance in the group of task-specific 
response thresholds. The accompanying univariate tests revealed that wives 
reported lower global response thresholds than husbands for laundry, bed making, 
bathroom cleaning, cleaning dishes, and clearing clutter (Table 11).  
Finally, A MANOVA was estimated to examine role differences in the six 
tasks measured using the disorder tolerance measure. Correlations between 
husbands’ and wives’ task-specific response thresholds as measured by the 
gradated response threshold measure ranged from .10 to .20, with Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity, χ2(44) = 734.18, p < .001, confirming the appropriateness of 
simultaneously examining the nine tasks measured by the disorder tolerance 
measure in a multivariate analysis. The results of the MANOVA indicated that 
men’s and women’s reports of task-specific response threshold differed 
significantly, F(9,126) = 4.26, p < .001, Wilks’ Lambda = .77, with role 
accounting for 23% of the variance in the group of task-specific response 
thresholds. The accompanying univariate tests revealed that wives reported lower 
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global response thresholds than husbands for laundry, bed making, bathroom 
cleaning, cleaning dishes, and clearing clutter (see Table 11).   
Taking into account the univariate effects across all three measures, wives 
reported significantly lower response thresholds than husbands for all domestic 
tasks but dusting. Means and standard deviations for husbands’ and wives’ global 
and task-specific response thresholds are reported in Table 3.  
Response Threshold and Domestic Labor Performance 
Global response threshold. Hypotheses 2 through 4 predicted that wives’ 
global threshold (H2), husbands’ thresholds (H3), and the interaction between the 
two (H4), would predict wives’ performance of domestic labor. Hypotheses 2 
through 4 were tested via a structural equation model with husbands’, wives’, and 
husband-threshold-by-wife-threshold as latent variables predicting wives’ 
proportion of domestic labor performance. Husbands’ and wives’ threshold levels 
were each modeled as latent variables comprised of three indicators 
corresponding to the three measures of response threshold used in this 
investigation (i.e., gradated response threshold, snapshot response threshold, 
disorder tolerance measure; see Figure 1). 
Multiple indices were used to evaluate model fit. Specifically, the χ2/df, 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) are reported for the model. A χ2/df of 3.00 or less (Carmines & 
McIver, 1981)  indicates a good fit. A CFI between .95 and .98 is considered a 
very good fit, and between .90 and .94 an acceptable or adequate fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999). An RMSEA of less than .06 indicates an excellent fit (Hu & 
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Bentler, 1999) and a value of .07 to .10 indicates adequate fit (Browne & Cudek, 
1993). Based on these criteria, the model demonstrated adequate to good fit, 
χ2(27) = 75.04, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.77, CFI = .93, RSMEA = .11. 
The path analysis for the model in Figure 1 provided support for 
hypotheses 2 and 3. Wives’ global response threshold levels were negatively 
associated with wives’ performance of global domestic labor (H1) and husbands’ 
global response threshold levels were positively associated with wives’ 
performance of global domestic labor (H2). Thus, the lower wives’ tolerance for 
domestic labor, the greater proportion of domestic labor will be performed by 
wives. Conversely, the higher husbands’ tolerance, the greater proportion of 
domestic labor will be performed by wives. The hypothesized interaction effect of 
wives’ and husbands’ response thresholds (H4) was not significant. 
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Task-specific response threshold. Hypotheses 5 through 7 predicted that 
actors’ task-specific thresholds (H5), partners’ task-specific thresholds (H6), and 
.11* 
 
-.12** 
Figure 1. Path Model for Response Threshold on Proportion of 
Household Labor Performed by Wives 
 
Figure 1. Standardized estimates for significant actor and partner effects 
are italicized.  
*p < .20. **p < .05. 
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the interaction between the two (H7), would predict actors’ performance of each 
of the following tasks: a) cleaning the bathroom, b) dusting, c) doing dishes, d) 
picking up clutter, e) taking out garbage, f) vacuuming, g) doing laundry, h) 
cleaning the kitchen, and i) making beds. Hypotheses 5 through 7 were tested 
using a series of APIMs. For each task, three separate APIMS were estimated, one 
for each of the measures of the dependent variables.   
 Hypothesis 5 was supported for eight of nine tasks. Significant actor 
effects emerged for bathroom cleaning, bed making, clearing clutter, cleaning 
dishes, cleaning kitchen surfaces, laundry, taking out garbage, and 
vacuuming/sweeping floors (significant effects are reported in Table 12.) 
Individuals’ response thresholds negatively associated with their performance of 
each of these tasks. The actor effects for taking out garbage and 
vacuuming/sweeping were each qualified by an interaction between actor 
response threshold and actor role (husband vs. wife). Examination of the simple 
slopes revealed that the effect of actor threshold on these two tasks is stronger for 
husbands than wives (See figures 2 and 3). Among husbands, performance of 
trash removal and vacuuming/sweeping is negatively associated with response 
threshold: the lower husbands' thresholds, the greater their contributions to trash 
removal and vacuuming/sweeping, respectively. For wives, however, response 
threshold for these two tasks is minimally effective. Wives' contributions to trash 
removal and vacuuming/sweeping are essentially identical regardless of response 
threshold. A key distinction between these two tasks, however, is that on average, 
wives perform more trash removal but less vacuuming/sweeping than husbands.  
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Figure 2. Actor-Threshold-By-Role Interaction on Trash Removal 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Actor-Threshold-By-Role Interaction on Vacuuming/Sweeping 
 
 
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Low actor threshold High actor threshold
T
ra
sh
 R
em
o
v
a
l 
Low role
High role
Husbands 
 
Wives 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Low actor threshold High actor threshold
V
a
cu
u
m
/S
w
ee
p
in
g
  
Low role
High role
Husban
ds 
 
Husbands 
 
 
Wives 
  50 
  Hypothesis 6 was supported for four of nine tasks. Significant partner 
effects emerged for bed making, clearing clutter, cleaning dishes, and taking out 
garbage (Table 12). Individuals’ partners’ response thresholds positively 
associated with individuals’ performance of each of these tasks. The partner effect 
for bed making, however, was qualified by an interaction between partner 
response threshold and partner role (husband vs. wife). Examination of the simple 
slopes revealed that the effect of partner threshold is stronger for husbands than 
wives (See figure 4). Among husbands, performance of bed making is positively 
associated with partners' response threshold: the higher husbands' partners' 
thresholds, the greater husbands' contributions to bed making. For wives, 
however, partners' response threshold is minimally effective. Wives' contributions 
to bed making are essentially identical regardless of their partners' response 
threshold.  
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Figure 4. Partner-Threshold-By-Role on Bed Making
 
Hypothesis 7 predicted an interaction between actors’ and partners’ 
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Figure 5. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold Effect on Bed Making 
 
 
Figure 6. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold Effect on Vacuuming/Sweeping 
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The significant actor-partner interaction for bathroom cleaning and 
laundry were each qualified by role, thus only the 3-way (actor-by-partner-by-
role) interactions are interpreted for those tasks. For laundry, performance among 
wives and among husbands with relatively low thresholds increases as one’s 
partner's threshold increases. For husbands with relatively high thresholds, 
however, performance of laundry decreases as their wives' threshold increases 
(Figure 7). For bathroom cleaning, examination of the simple slopes revealed two 
distinct patterns. For husbands with relatively high thresholds and wives with 
relatively low thresholds, contributions to bathroom cleaning increase as their 
partners’ threshold increased. By contrast, among husbands with relatively high 
thresholds and wives with relatively low thresholds, contributions to bathroom 
cleaning increased as partners’ threshold increased (Figure 8). 
  
  54 
Figure 7. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold-By-Role Effect on Laundry 
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Figure 8. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold-By-Role Effect on Cleaning 
Bathrooms 
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interaction was not significant for any of the three measures of global response 
threshold. Thus, Hypothesis 9 was not supported. 
Demand/withdraw.  
Actor-demand/partner-withdrawal. Hypotheses 10 through 12 predicted 
that actors’ global response thresholds (H10), partners’ global response thresholds 
(H11), and the interaction between the two (H12), would predict actors’ reports of 
actor-demand/partner-withdrawal. Research questions 2 through 4 asked whether 
the hypothesized actor, partner, and actor-by-partner interaction effects were 
qualified by actor role (husband vs. wife). To evaluate the hypotheses and 
research questions, a series of APIMS were estimated, one for each of the 
measures of response threshold. Table 13 summarizes the significant effects 
obtained 
in these APIMs. 
Hypothesis 10 predicted that actors’ global response threshold levels 
would negatively associate with their reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal 
during division of labor conflict. (i.e., the lower an actor’s threshold, the more 
he/she demands while his/her partner withdraws). Research question 2 asked 
whether the relationship between actor global response threshold and actor-
demand/partner-withdrawal differed according to the actor’s role (husband vs. 
wife). No significant actor effects emerged for global response threshold on actor-
demand/partner-withdrawal across the three measure of response threshold. 
However, in response to research question 2, a significant interaction effect 
emerged for actor-threshold-by-role on actor-demand/partner-withdrawal for the 
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snapshot response threshold measure. Examination of the simple slopes revealed 
that wives engage in more actor-demand/partner-withdraw as their threshold 
decreases, whereas for husbands, the opposite is true. Men engage in less actor-
demand/partner-withdrawal as their threshold decreases (see Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Actor-Threshold-By-Role Effect on Actor-Demand/Partner-Withdrawal  
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Hypothesis 11 predicted that partners’ global response threshold levels 
would positively associate with actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-
withdrawal during division of labor conflict (i.e., the higher a partner’s threshold, 
the more the actor demands while the partner withdraws). Research question 3 
asked whether the relationship between partners’ global response threshold levels 
and actors’ reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal varied according to the 
actor’s role (husband vs. wife). No significant partner effects, nor any partner-by-
role effects, emerged across the three measures of response threshold. Thus, 
hypothesis 11 was not supported, and no conclusions could be drawn in response 
to research question 3.  
Hypothesis 12 predicted that actors’ and partners’ response thresholds 
would interact to predict actor reports of actor-demand/partner-withdrawal during 
division of labor conflict. Research question 4 asked whether the hypothesized 
interaction effect for actors’ and partners’ response thresholds on actor-
demand/partner-withdrawal was qualified by actor role (husband vs. wife). No 
significant actor-by-partner interaction effects emerged across the measures of 
response threshold. However, a significant actor-threshold-by-partner-threshold-
by-role emerged for the gradated response threshold measure. Examination of the 
simple slopes revealed that the source of the interaction resides among husbands 
with lower thresholds (see figure 10). For all other groups (i.e., husbands with 
higher thresholds, as well as wives regardless of threshold level), actor-
demand/partner-withdrawal increases as partners' threshold increases. In other 
words, demand-withdrawal is more likely to the extent that one's partner has a 
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higher threshold.  By contrast, among husbands with lower thresholds, reports of 
actor-demand/partner-withdrawal decrease as their wives’ threshold increase.  
Figure 10. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold-By-Role Effect on Actor-
Demand/Partner-Withdraw  
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each of the measures of response threshold. Table 13 summarizes the significant 
effects obtained 
in these APIMs. 
Hypothesis 13 predicted that actors’ global response threshold levels 
would positively associate with their reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal 
during division of labor conflict (i.e., the higher an actor’s threshold, the more 
his/her partner demands while the actor withdraws). Research question 5 asked 
whether the relationship between actor global response threshold and partner-
demand/actor-withdrawal varied according to the actor’s role (husband vs. wife). 
A significant actor effect emerged for global response threshold on partner-
demand/actor-withdrawal for both the gradated response threshold and snapshot 
response threshold measures. Thus, hypothesis 13 was supported. In response to 
research question 5, no significant actor-by-role effects emerged. In sum, for both 
husbands and wives, the higher one’s threshold, the more likely one is to report 
partner-demand/actor-withdrawal in division of labor conflict. 
Hypothesis 14 predicted that partners’ global response threshold levels 
would negatively associate with actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-
withdrawal during division of labor conflict (i.e., the lower a partner’s threshold, 
the more he/she demands while the actor withdraws). Research question 6 asked 
whether the relationship between partners’ global response threshold levels and 
actors’ reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal varied according to the actor’s 
role (husband vs. wife). A significant partner effect emerged for global response 
threshold on partner-demand/actor-withdrawal for the snapshot response 
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threshold measure.  Thus, hypothesis 14 was supported. In response to research 
question 6, no significant partner-by-role effects emerged. In sum, for both 
husbands and wives, the lower one’s partner’s threshold, the more likely one is to 
report partner-demand/actor-withdrawal in division of labor conflict. 
Hypothesis 15 predicted that actors’ and partners’ response thresholds 
would interact to predict actor reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal during 
division of labor conflict. Research question 7 asked whether the hypothesized 
interaction effect for actors’ and partners’ response thresholds on partner-
demand/actor-withdrawal was qualified by actor role (husband vs. wife). A 
significant actor-by-partner interaction effect emerged for the gradated response 
threshold and snapshot response threshold measures. Thus, hypothesis 15 is 
supported. Examination of the simple slopes revealed that the effect of actor 
threshold on partner-demand/actor-withdrawal is stronger when individuals’ 
partners have relatively low thresholds (see Figure 11). For individuals whose 
partners have relatively low thresholds, partner-demand/actor-withdrawal 
increases as the actor's threshold increases. However, among individuals whose 
partners have relatively high thresholds, partner-demand/actor-withdrawal is 
essentially unaffected by actor's threshold.  In regards to research question 7, no 
significant actor-by-partner-by-role effects were obtained. 
 
 
 
  62 
Figure 11. Actor-Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold Effect on Partner-Demand / 
Actor-Withdraw 
 
As described in the preceding paragraphs, none of the significant actor, 
partner, or actor-by-partner interaction effects for partner-demand/actor-
withdrawal was qualified by the role variable (husband vs. wife). However, there 
was a significant main effect for role on partner-demand/actor-withdrawal for 
both the snapshot response threshold measure and the disorder tolerance 
measure, such that husbands report more partner-demand/actor-withdrawal in 
division of labor conflict than do wives.  
Avoidance. Hypothesis 16 predicted that actors’ and partners’ global 
response threshold levels would interact to predict actors’ reports of mutual 
avoidance during division of labor conflict. The hypothesized actor-partner 
interaction was not significant for any of the three measures of global response 
threshold. Thus, hypothesis 16 was not supported. 
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Research question 8 asked whether the hypothesized interaction effect of 
actors’ threshold and partners’ threshold on avoidance was qualified by actors’ 
perceived benefits of avoidance. As described previously, the principal 
components analysis of the perceived benefits measure revealed three distinct 
factors: 1) the perception that it is easier to simply do the work than ask for help 
(i.e., easier to do it myself), 2) the perception that engaging in conflict won’t 
improve the situation (i.e., not going to improve), and 3) the perception that it is 
not appropriate to engage in conflict over household labor (i.e., not worth fighting 
about). The effects of each of these perceptions were estimated separately. 
Therefore, a total of nine APIMs were estimated, one for each of the three 
perceptions, crossed with each of the three measures of response threshold. 
Several main and interaction effect emerged; table 14 summarizes the significant 
effects obtained. 
First, a main effect emerged for the easier to do it myself belief. Actors’ 
perception that it is easier to do household work oneself than to negotiate help 
from one’s partner is positively associated with their reports of mutual avoidance 
of division of labor conflict. This belief was also found to interact with actors’ 
and partners’ response thresholds to predict mutual avoidance. Examination of the 
simple slopes revealed three distinct patterns embedded within this interaction 
(see Figure 12). For individuals who have relatively low thresholds and whose 
partners have relatively high thresholds, mutual avoidance is more likely to the 
extent that actors perceive that it is easier to do the work oneself than to engage in 
conflict. This pattern also holds true for individuals who have relatively high 
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thresholds and whose partners have relatively low thresholds.  The opposite 
pattern is true among individuals who have a relatively low threshold and whose 
partners have a relatively low threshold as well. For actors in these dyads, mutual 
avoidance is less likely to the extent that actors espouse the belief that housework 
is less work than conflict over housework. Finally, among individuals who have 
relatively high thresholds and whose partners have relatively high thresholds as 
well, reports of mutual avoidance are unaffected by the perception that housework 
is less demanding that household labor conflict. 
Figure 12. Actor Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold-By-Actor-Easier-To-Do-It-
Myself -Belief Effect on Mutual Avoidance 
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Finally, a main effect for the not worth fighting about belief also emerged. 
Actors’ espousal of the belief that it is not appropriate to engage in conflict over 
household labor positively associated with actors’ reports of mutual avoidance of 
domestic labor conflict. The not worth fighting about belief was also found to 
interact with actors’ and partners’ response thresholds to predict mutual 
avoidance. Examination of the simple slopes revealed two distinct patterns 
embedded within this interaction (see Figure 13). For dyads in which partners are 
more dissimilar in response thresholds, mutual avoidance is more likely to the 
extent that actors perceive division of labor conflict to be not worth fighting 
about. For dyads in which partners are more similar in response thresholds, 
mutual avoidance is less likely to the extent that actors perceive division of labor 
conflict to be not worth fighting about.  
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Figure 13. Actor Threshold-By-Partner-Threshold-By-Actor- Not-Worth-
Fighting-About -Belief Effect on Mutual Avoidance
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Chapter 5 
DISCUSSION 
Summary and Implications 
According to the integrated theory of the division of domestic labor 
(Alberts, et al., 2011), response threshold is an important individual difference 
contributing to the allocation of domestic labor in heterosexual households. 
Previous research has demonstrated that response thresholds associate 
significantly with domestic labor contributions and domestic labor conflict among 
same-sex roommates. Through the present study, I sought to extend this literature 
through a focus on domestic labor allocation and domestic labor conflict in 
heterosexual marriages.  
Through this study I also sought to complicate our understanding of 
reasons for avoidance of household labor conflict. Researchers interested in the 
management of household labor conflict have noted that dissatisfaction with 
division of domestic labor does not always produce explicit conflict (Weismann, 
et al., 2008). Previous research based on qualitative interviews has suggested 
possible reasons for stoicism in the face of dissatisfaction with labor allocation, 
such as the perception that household labor is an unworthy conflict topic 
(Weismann, et al., 2008). Given these suggestions by previous research, and given 
that avoidance of domestic labor conflict tends to be associated with negative 
relational outcomes, the present study was also a means to find  empirical 
evidence of various “logics” of household labor conflict avoidance. 
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A unique feature of the present investigation is its focus on marital dyads. 
The focus on dyads confers benefits in regards to both method and theory. 
Methodologically, dyadic analysis allows for the examination of the effects of 
features of each spouse on their own behavior, as well as their influence on their 
spouse. In terms of testing theory, dyadic analysis is preferable because it allows 
for the examination of tenets of the integrated theory of the division of domestic 
labor at two levels. At the individual level, the influence of response threshold on 
individual behavior is examined. At the dyadic level, the interaction among dyad 
members’ response thresholds is modeled. The latter is a critical component for 
testing the integrated theory of the division of domestic labor, given that it claims 
explicitly that domestic labor allocation is co-produced among members of the 
household.  
Role differences in response threshold. In this study, wives reported 
significantly lower global response thresholds across the three measures – the 
gradated response threshold measure, snapshot response threshold measure, and 
disorder tolerance scale. Also, wives reported significantly lower task-specific 
response thresholds than husbands for all tasks except dusting. In other words, 
wives are disturbed sooner than husbands by household disorder and tasks 
undone. This finding supports an important tenet of the integrative theory, that on 
average women are likely to possess lower threshold levels than men and that this 
difference contributes to their over-performance of domestic labor.  Although we 
now know that threshold level is associated with sex, it is not yet clear why this is 
true.  Alberts et al. argue that women’s lower threshold may be due to their 
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greater sensitivity to smells and more keen awareness of details (Doty, 
Applebaumk, Zushos, & Settle, 1985; Thuerauf et al., 2009; Sax, 2005). They 
also hypothesize that it may also be due, in part, to role socialization (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2003; Canary & Emmers-Sommer, 1997; Maccoby, 1990; West & 
Zimmerman, 1987).  Both of these explanations, as well as others, need to be 
studied so that we can better understand the origin of this role difference.  
Significant role effects in this study should also be interpreted in light of 
the modest effect sizes obtained. Role accounted for 12% of the variance in the 
composite measure of global response threshold. For task-specific response 
thresholds, variance explained ranged from 4% to 11% depending on the task. 
Therefore, sex explains a substantial, but not an overwhelming, portion of the 
variance in individual response threshold. Moreover, it is important to not 
overlook instances in which husbands possess lower thresholds than their wives. 
In this study, although wives had lower response thresholds in the aggregate, 
husbands reported lower global thresholds in roughly one-third (36%) of dyads. 
Therefore, future research should tease out other factors that contribute to 
response threshold (e.g., personality factors), conditions in which men are likely 
to be bothered sooner, and how this affects both household labor allocation and 
communication about housework.  
Task performance as a function of response threshold. For global 
housework, as well as all tasks except dusting, actors made greater contributions 
to domestic labor the lower their response thresholds – that is, the more disturbed 
they were by tasks undone.  However, for two tasks - trash removal and 
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vacuuming/sweeping – this effect held for husbands but not wives. Wives' 
contributions to trash removal and vacuuming/sweeping were essentially identical 
regardless of their level of disturbance.  
For global housework, as well as five tasks - making beds, clearing clutter, 
cleaning dishes, and taking out garbage - actors made greater contributions to 
household labor the greater their partners' thresholds – that is, the less disturbed 
their partners were. For bed making, however, this effect held for husbands but 
not wives. Wives' contributions to bed making were essentially identical 
regardless of how bothered their husbands' were.  
These significant actor and partner effects validate a central claim of the 
integrative theory of the division of domestic labor: individuals with lower 
threshold levels, and those whose partner possess higher thresholds, perform more 
domestic labor.  This is true both globally and for specific domestic tasks.  These 
findings suggest, then, that threshold level differences provide at least a partial 
explanation for the allocation of domestic labor among heterosexual couples.  The 
results are important for two reasons. Foremost, this is the first theory of 
household labor allocation, apart from sex role theory, to receive empirical 
support. This finding allows us to better understand the individual characteristics 
that impact the performance of household labor. In addition, the findings provide 
a theoretical explanation that models behavior by both sexes. That is, for most 
tasks, threshold levels predict domestic labor performance regardless of an 
individual’s sex.   
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The integrated theory of the division of domestic labor also predicts that 
the effect of both spouses’ thresholds, relative to one another, explains the 
allocation of domestic labor. Previous research (O'Colmain & Alberts, 2008; 
Riforgiate, 2011) found that one partner’s report of threshold differences among 
dyad members associated with greater disparities in global household labor 
performance. In the present study, the impact of dyad members’ relative threshold 
levels was assessed through the examination of actor-partner interaction effects. 
The predicted actor-partner interactions were observed for only two tasks (i.e., 
making beds and vacuuming/sweeping). For two additional tasks (i.e., bathroom 
cleaning and laundry) an actor-partner effect emerged but was qualified by role, 
creating a pattern that deviated from the predictions of the theory. For the 
remaining tasks, as well as for global thresholds, no significant actor-partner 
interactions emerged.  
The failure in the present study to replicate the findings of Riforgiate 
(2011) and O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) may be due to differences in the 
populations under investigation.  For instance, it may be the case that 
discrepancies in threshold serve as a larger determinant of labor allocation among 
same-sex roommates compared to marital dyads, given that in the latter, partners 
also contend with gender performance and marital role expectations (Davis, 
Greenstein, & Gerteisen Marks, 2007). Alternately, the difference in findings 
could be attributed to a difference in method of measuring partners' relative 
thresholds between previous investigations and the present study. Previous 
research has relied on one partner’s reports of the discrepancy in response 
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thresholds within the dyad. For example, O’Colmain and Alberts (2008) asked 
participants to rate their own threshold in comparison to their partner (e.g., 
dusting left undone “would bother me and my roommate equally,” vs. “would 
bother me a lot more”). By contrast, in the present study, discrepancies in 
threshold are modeled as an interaction term encompassing each spouse’s reports 
of their own threshold. This approach is advantageous in that collecting data from 
both spouses probably produces more accurate estimates of threshold differences. 
The drawback is that statistical interactions are difficult to detect after controlling 
for main effects. Thus, for the purposes of this study, threshold influences at the 
dyadic level can really only be examined in terms of separate actor and partner 
main effects. This fact doesn’t detract from the integrative theory, however. 
Despite the fact that few significant interaction effects were obtained, it is clear 
from these data that both spouses’ thresholds impact domestic labor allocation.  
Based on the relative number of actor effects detected relative to partner 
effects, the larger estimates for actor versus partner effects, the larger proportion 
of variance accounted for by actor effects compared to partner effects, and the 
mostly nonsignificant interaction effects, these data suggest that one’s own 
threshold is a stronger determinant of behavior than one’s partner’s threshold or 
the difference between the two. This is not surprising, given that in most social- 
and behavioral-scientific research, individuals’ behavior is more strongly linked 
to their own attitudes rather than others’ attitudes. In this case, one’s own 
threshold likely serves as a kind of “anchor” for one’s performance. One’s 
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partner’s threshold may “check” that behavior, depending on his/her threshold 
level for a given task.  
The relative influence of response threshold versus role. In this 
investigation, actors’ response thresholds accounted for substantial proportions of 
the variance in performance (range = 2% to 19%, mean = 7.1%), yet these were 
smaller than the proportion of variance accounted for by role (range = 5% and 
51%, mean = 26.1%). At face value, role is the more robust predictor of domestic 
labor performance. However, these findings do not necessarily detract from the 
importance of response threshold as a construct, nor undermine the theory being 
tested. The integrative theory of the division of domestic labor (Alberts et al., 
2011) posits that the influence of one’s threshold on performance over time leads 
to a division of labor that is implicitly agreed-upon but relatively firm. In the 
words of Alberts et al. (2011), various tasks come to be understood in the dyad as 
“belonging” to the individual who performs them frequently. In this way, Alberts 
et al. argue, even small initial sex differences in threshold can become 
exaggerated into large sex differences in performance. This line of thinking is 
helpful in interpreting the findings of the present study. The comparatively 
smaller effect of response threshold may be due to the fact that at the time of this 
cross-sectional investigation, couples had been married an average of 
approximately 20 years, and therefore initial individual differences in threshold 
have over time been sedimented into implicit task assignments by role. Previous 
research on other forms of domestic labor has shown that the sedimentation 
process can happen rather quickly. In the case of infant caretaking (Hrdy, 1999), 
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very small sex differences in responsiveness to an infant’s cry exhibit a 
schismogenetic effect, leading to a major inequality in caretaking responsibility 
while the child is still very young. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the 
observed effects of threshold and sex in the present study are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, response threshold, in addition to operating as a predictor in its 
own right, is arguably partly constitutive of the observed sex differences in 
performance.       
Response threshold and demand/withdraw patterns. The findings for 
the demand/withdrawal pattern in this study support the integrative theory of the 
division of domestic labor as well as contribute to the literature on the structure of 
demand/withdrawal in marital conflict. Partners’ response thresholds affect the 
presence of demand/withdrawal in domestic labor conflict, and importantly, 
influence who demands and who withdraws.  
The findings for individuals’ reports of partner-demand/actor-withdrawal 
(i.e., individuals reporting that their partner pursues while they avoid or flee the 
discussion) were relatively straightforward. Both husbands and wives reported 
that their spouse demand, and they withdraw, the lower the spouse’s threshold. 
Husbands and wives also reported that their own thresholds effected partner-
demand/actor-withdraw (i.e., partner-demand/actor-withdraw increased as actors 
thresholds increased), but only if they were married to someone fairly disturbed 
by household disorder. The lower one spouse’s level of disturbance (i.e., the 
higher one spouse’s threshold), the less that one’s own threshold affects partner-
demand/actor-withdrawal. 
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The findings for actor-demand/partner-withdraw were more complex. 
Wives report that the higher their disturbance by household disorder, the more 
they demand and their husbands withdraw. For husbands, the opposite is true. The 
more disturbed husbands are, the less they demand and the less their wives’ 
withdraw. To further complicate matters, the effects of one’s partner’s threshold 
effects husbands and wives differently. Wives, regardless of their own threshold, 
are more likely to report that they demand and that their husbands withdraw the 
higher their husband’s thresholds. However, the effect of wives’ thresholds on 
husband-demand/wife-withdraw differs depending on husbands’ own threshold. 
Husbands with relatively high thresholds report demanding more the higher their 
wives’ thresholds. Husbands with relatively low thresholds (i.e., those who are 
more disturbed by household disorder) actually demand less the higher their 
wives’ thresholds. One possible explanation for this difference is men’s greater 
likelihood of experiencing emotional flooding during conflict. Emotional flooding 
refers to an overwhelming and diffuse physiological arousal that disrupts men’s 
ability to remain engaged in conflict (Gottman, 199). Perhaps for men with low 
threshold levels, their dissatisfaction with their partners may create negative 
emotions that instead of motivating them to confront, compels them to avoid or 
withdraw. This may also help to explain patterns observed in previous research 
whereby husband-initiated topics are more likely to produce husband-
withdraw/wife-demand (Holtzworth-Munroe, et al., 1998; Klinetob & Smith, 
1996; Papp, et al., 2009). 
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The above findings are consistent with previous demand/withdraw 
research suggesting that sex and topic initiator work in concert to influence the 
structure of demand/withdraw (Holtzworth-Munroe, et al., 1998; Klinetob & 
Smith, 1996; Papp, et al., 2009). That is, wives’ demanding behavior is a function 
of the degree to which they seek change in the status quo – evidence of the 
importance of the structure of the conflict. However, the same is not true for 
husbands, which is evidence for the importance of marital role. The latter suggests 
that with respect to housework, husbands do not report responding to the role of 
“complainee” in the same way that wives do.  In all, the data in the present study 
suggest that the role of topic initiator is at least as influential in demand/withdraw 
patterns as is role: the summed effect sizes for actor threshold, partner threshold, 
and the actor by partner threshold interaction indicate that those three effects 
account for 12% of the variance, compared to a range of 5-8% of variance 
accounted for by actor role.    
Finally, the findings here demonstrate a discrepancy in husbands’ and 
wives’ reports of wives’ demanding behavior and husbands’ withdrawing 
behavior. There was a significant sex difference in reports of partner-
demand/actor-withdrawal, such that husbands report more partner-demand/actor-
withdrawal in division of labor conflict than do wives. That is, husbands report 
that their wives demand more than vice versa. However, there was not a 
statistically significant difference between husbands’ and wives’ reports of their 
own demanding behavior. Thus, husbands report that wives demand more, but 
wives do not necessarily agree.  On one hand, there may be a social desirability 
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bias operating in that women are reticent to report that they demand. On the other 
hand, cultural stereotypes hold that women complain more than men, which may 
be activated when husbands and wives are asked to describe the conflict roles 
taken on by their spouses. 
The logic of avoidance. It is somewhat of a curiosity to scholars that 
individuals who are overburdened by domestic labor should not always engage in 
explicit conflict about it. In the face of inequity, whereas some individuals engage 
in overt conflict, still others exhibit a sort of stoicism, silently enduring unfairness 
and at times making concessions alone to make the workload more manageable 
(Weismann, et al., 2008).  
 Previous literature has hinted at some of the reasons why individuals 
might avoid conflict in the face of inequity. Based on this literature, three reasons 
were assessed and tested in this study. Support was found for two – the perception 
that it is easier to perform household labor oneself than to engage in conflict 
about it, and the perception that household labor is not a worthy or appropriate 
topic for conflict. Taken together, these findings expand our understanding of the 
dynamics of domestic labor conflict, but also push the boundaries of how scholars 
should study the division of domestic labor in marital households.  
 It was found that actors generally report more mutual conflict avoidance 
in the dyad to the extent that they perceive it to be easier to perform household 
labor themselves than to engage in overt conflict about it. A significant 3-way 
interaction revealed that this effect held for dyads in which partners have the most 
discrepant thresholds (with either the actor or the partner reporting the lower 
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threshold), but was reversed for those in which dyad members have similarly high 
thresholds. (For couples who had similarly low thresholds, mutual avoidance was 
unaffected by perception that performing housework is easier.) One interpretation 
for this finding is that among the most threshold-discrepant dyads, the difference 
in standards makes common ground more elusive and thus the difficulty of 
engaging in conflict is made more salient. What is interesting, however, is that 
this effect occurs for actors both when they possess the lower threshold as well as 
when they report a higher threshold than their partner. The former invokes images 
of stoicism described in previous research, whereby a lower-threshold-possessing, 
overburdened, partner performs the lion’s share of housework rather than trying to 
negotiate change with a reluctant partner. The latter, however, may represent 
scenarios in which the higher-threshold possessing partner conforms to the 
standards of his/her spouse, even though he/she is not yet bothered by it. 
Regardless of who is accommodating whom, a key implication of these findings 
is that marital dyads appear to be weighing the physical labor of performing 
common household tasks against the emotional labor (Erickson, 2005; 
Hochschild, 1983) of explicit negotiations about housework.  
It was also found that actors generally reported more conflict avoidance in 
the dyad to the extent that they espoused the belief that household labor was not 
worth fighting about. As with the easier to do it myself belief, a significant 
interaction effect revealed that this pattern held only for couples with dissimilar 
response thresholds. The importance of the not worth fighting about belief is 
probably best gleaned by examining it in its historical context. I would argue that 
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the perception that household labor is not a worthy or appropriate source or topic 
of conflict is at least partly a remnant of thinking about the private sphere that 
emerged in the United States as a result of the industrial revolution. Prior to the 
industrial revolution, there was no division of public and private spheres of work, 
as families in agrarian economies worked as a unit to feed, clothe, and provide 
shelter for members. Whatever could not be produced by the family unit could be 
traded or bartered for with other families in the community. With the advent of 
industrialization, however, the shift to mass production divided family members 
into those who worked in public production for pay, and those who worked in 
familial production for the upkeep of the household. As sociologists and 
historians have pointed out (Siegel, 1994; Williams, 2000), the cultural legacy of 
this logistical change was that the private sphere came to be understood as a place 
of refuge or respite from the harried life of the public sphere. As Siegel explains, 
in the post-industrial private sphere, a husband found he could:  
[Seek] refuge from the vexations and embarrassments of business, an 
enchanting repose from exertion, a relaxation from care by the interchange 
of affection: where some of his finest sympathies, tastes, and moral and 
religious feelings are formed and nourished, - where is the treasury of pure 
disinterested love, such as is seldom found in the busy walks of a selfish 
and calculating world. (p. 1196) 
As such, the private sphere was transformed from a place in which business 
transactions were a regular part of everyday life, to a place not to be sullied by 
rational bargaining. The result of this ideology has been observed throughout 
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American political culture, not least in American family law, where attempts to 
collect entitlements for domestic work – say, in the case of a failed marriage – 
have been labeled “cold” or “calculated” (Williams, 2000)  
I would argue that traces of this ideology also permeate interpersonal 
interactions surrounding household labor, and such is the reason that we see 
participants avoiding division of labor conflict because it they believe it is not 
“appropriate.”  Individuals’ reticence to engage in overt negotiations of “who will 
do what” may be, at least in part, a result of an ideology that in so doing, the 
concept of marriage or romance is somehow corrupted or demeaned. The material 
consequence of such a belief, of course, is that couples are more likely to rely on 
implicit arrangements that, if this study is any indication, benefit the higher-
threshold possessing partner.   
Taken together, the findings on reasons for avoidance make three 
contributions to the study of household labor conflict avoidance. First, although 
mutual avoidance is associated with negative relational outcomes, it may a 
reasonable choice that is best for individuals and couples who feel they have more 
to lose than gain by initiating conflict. Second, this study provides further 
evidence for the inclusion of emotion work in conceptualizations of household 
labor. Finally, these findings suggest that more research is needed to understand 
the potential “chilling effect” of a perception that household labor is somehow an 
unworthy or inappropriate conflict topic. As I have argued here, that is probably 
best done in light of the politico-cultural context in which couples negotiate their 
private lives. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 Although this study uncovered several findings that contribute to our 
understanding of household labor allocation and conflict, and in so doing 
supported and refined the integrative theory, it is not without limitations. First, 
this study relied on self-reports of general conflict behavior. A potential 
disadvantage of this form of self-report data compared to diary methods is that 
self-report assessments usually rely on participants’ ability to recall information 
and generalize about conflict patterns. That limitation could potentially be 
countered in future research if a focus on a specific conflict episode (i.e., the most 
recent conflict over the division of domestic labor), rather than a global 
assessment of domestic-labor-related conflicts, were employed.  
Second, the couples in this sample were fairly satisfied with the division 
of labor in their homes and did not engage in division of labor conflict very 
frequently. This pattern is typical in social scientific studies that rely on non-
random volunteer samples, wherein more satisfied couples are more likely to 
participate. Moreover, given the association between division of labor conflict and 
marital difficulty, and the fact that the couples in this sample had been married an 
average of twenty years, these couples ostensibly represent those who have 
resolved (or suppressed, perhaps) the majority of their division of labor 
disagreements.  Therefore, the findings of this study are most generalizable to 
non-distressed couples. Future research should attempt to replicate the findings 
among moderately or even highly-distressed couples, particularly because those 
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are the couples for which the deleterious effects of household labor inequity might 
be the most salient. Future research should also examine dyads at different stages 
of coupledom (e.g., newlyweds, new parents), as well as examine the influence of 
individuals’ pre-cohabitation response thresholds on labor allocation and domestic 
labor conflict after the couple has moved in together.  
Third, although hours spent weekly in paid work were entered as control 
variables, the analyses here did not account for presence of children in the home, 
nor children’s contributions to household labor. Both of these factors should be 
considered in future studies, given that the presence of children can certainly add 
to, as well as relieve (for better or worse), the burden of domestic labor on one or 
both parents.  
Finally, this program of research can be greatly enhanced through a better 
understanding of the composition and features of response thresholds: To what 
extent are response thresholds biologically based? To what extent are thresholds a 
product of modeling and/or socialization? How rigid or stable are individual 
response thresholds? Are threshold levels influenced by life events such as change 
in marital status, occupation change, or the birth of children? To what extent do 
spouses influence each other’s response thresholds? Answers to these and similar 
questions will both clarify the nature of this newly articulated theoretical 
construct as well as illuminate its role in couples’ communication about unpaid 
domestic labor.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study provides initial support for the integrative theory of the division of 
domestic labor among heterosexual married couples; it provides evidence that 
individuals’ response thresholds are influential in their and their partners’ 
domestic labor performance, as well as dyadic domestic labor conflict patterns. In 
so doing, it helps to further our understanding of the reasons that women often 
shoulder a heavier burden of domestic labor, even when controlling for hours 
spend by partners in paid work, while simultaneously highlighting the fact that in 
roughly a third of dyads, husbands are more disturbed by household disorder than 
their wives. This study also extends our understanding of both the 
demand/withdraw and mutual avoidance conflict patterns, which are particularly 
important given the negative relational outcomes associated with deploying these 
two strategies in response to dissatisfaction with allocation of household labor. 
This investigation also contributes an innovative method of measuring the 
construct of response threshold, one that more clearly operationalizes “disorder” 
and “disturbance.” Perhaps most importantly, this study has examined these 
relationships from a dyadic perspective – looking at the complementary behaviors 
of dyad members, as well as assessing the effects of both dyad members on 
domestic labor performance and communication about it. 
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Table 1      
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation of The CPQ-
SF 
When issues or problems 
arise related to 
housework or household 
chores, how likely is it 
that… 
Actor- 
Demand / 
Partner 
Withdraw 
Partner-
Demand / 
Actor-
Withdraw 
Mutually 
Cons-
tructive 
Mutually 
Avoidant 
You criticize while your 
partner tries to ignore 
you 
 
0.85 0.09 -0.09 -0.02 
You attempt to discuss the 
problem while your 
partner tries to avoid 
the topic 
 
0.85 0.20 0.01 0.11 
You complain, but your 
partner doesn’t even 
want to talk about the 
issue 
 
0.82 0.18 -0.10 0.10 
You nag or demand while 
your partner 
withdraws, becomes 
silent, or refuses to 
discuss the matter 
further 
 
0.82 0.11 -0.17 0.04 
Your partner nags or 
demands while you 
withdraw, become 
silent, or refuse to 
discuss the matter 
further 
 
0.13 0.86 -0.11 0.08 
Your partner complains, 
but you don’t want to 
talk about the issue 
 
0.15 0.85 -0.05 0.09 
Your partner criticizes 
while you try to ignore 
him/her 
 
0.23 0.81 -0.16 0.07 
Your partner attempts to 
discuss the problem 
while you try to avoid 
the topic 
 
0.10 0.80 -0.13 0.21 
Both partners suggest 
possible solutions or 
compromises 
-0.18 -0.14 0.87 -0.14 
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Both you and your partner 
try to constructively 
discuss the problem 
 
-0.18 -0.16 0.86 -0.15 
Both you and your partner 
express your feelings 
to each other 
 
0.02 -0.10 0.81 -0.27 
Neither you nor your 
partner brings up the 
issue 
 
-0.05 0.05 -0.14 0.87 
Neither you nor your 
partner talk about the 
problem 
 
0.07 0.11 -0.20 0.82 
Both you and your partner 
avoid discussing the 
problem 
 
0.19 0.26 -0.192 0.72 
Note. Factor loadings > .50 are in boldface. 
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Table 2      
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the Actor-Demand /Partner-Withdraw Factor of the 
CPQ-SF 
When issues or problems arise 
related to housework or 
household chores, how likely 
is it that… 
1 2 3 4 
1. You criticize while your 
partner tries to ignore you 
 
-    
2. You attempt to discuss the 
problem while your partner 
tries to avoid the topic 
 
.62*** -   
3. You complain, but your partner 
doesn’t even want to talk 
about the issue 
 
.62*** .74*** -  
4. You nag or demand while your 
partner withdraws, becomes 
silent, or refuses to discuss 
the matter further 
 
.68*** .60*** .56*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 3      
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the Partner-Demand / Actor-Withdraw Factor of 
the CPQ-SF 
When issues or problems arise 
related to housework or 
household chores, how likely 
is it that… 
1 2 3 4 
1. Your partner nags or demands 
while you withdraw, become 
silent, or refuse to discuss 
the matter further 
 
-    
2. Your partner complains, but 
you don’t want to talk about 
the issue 
 
.69*** -   
3. Your partner criticizes while 
you try to ignore him/her 
 
.68*** .66*** - . 
4. Your partner attempts to 
discuss the problem while 
you try to avoid the topic 
 
.63*** .61*** .65*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 4     
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the Mutually Constructive Factor of the CPQ-SF 
When issues or problems arise 
related to housework or 
household chores, how likely is it 
that… 
1 2 3 
1. Both partners suggest possible 
solutions or compromises 
 
-   
2. Both you and your partner try to 
constructively discuss the 
problem 
 
.76*** -  
3. Both you and your partner express 
your feelings to each other 
 
.64*** .63*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 5     
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the Mutually Avoidant Factor of the CPQ-SF 
When issues or problems arise 
related to housework or 
household chores, how likely is it 
that… 
1 2 3 
1. Neither you nor your partner 
brings up the issue 
 
-   
2. Neither you nor your partner talk 
about the problem 
 
.61*** -  
3. Both you and your partner avoid 
discussing the problem 
 
.52*** .50*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 6     
Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis With Varimax Rotation of Perceived 
Benefits of Avoidance of Domestic Labor Conflict 
Please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements. 
Easier to do 
it myself 
Not worth 
fighting 
about  
Not going 
to improve 
It is easier to just do household work 
myself than try to get my partner to 
help 
 
0.85 0.09 0.18 
It is easier to do household work on my 
own than explain to my partner what 
needs to be done 
 
0.85 0.08 0.16 
I would rather just do housework myself 
than get in a disagreement with my 
partner about it 
 
0.70 0.23 -0.07 
I do not think housework is worth having a 
disagreement about 
 
0.03 0.81 0.01 
Problems with the division of housework 
are not worth mentioning 
 
0.28 0.73 0.24 
Discussing who does which household 
chores is not appropriate 
 
0.13 0.67 0.14 
Having a disagreement about the division 
of housework with my partner will lead 
to positive change (reversed) 
 
0.04 0.13 0.87 
Having a disagreement over housework 
with my partner will improve the 
situation  (reversed) 
 
0.16 0.15 0.84 
Note. Factor loadings > .50 are in boldface. 
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Table 7     
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the “Easier to Do it Myself” Factor of the 
Perceived Benefits of Avoidance of Domestic Labor Conflict Scale 
Please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following 
statements. 
1 2  3 
It is easier to just do household work 
myself than try to get my partner to 
help 
 
-   
It is easier to do household work on my 
own than explain to my partner what 
needs to be done 
 
.67*** -  
I would rather just do housework myself 
than get in a disagreement with my 
partner about it 
 
.43*** .43*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 8     
Intercorrelations for Items Forming the “Not Worth Fighting About” Factor of the 
Perceived Benefits of Avoidance of Domestic Labor Conflict Scale 
Please indicate your agreement or 
disagreement with the following statements. 
1 2  3 
I do not think housework is worth having a 
disagreement about 
 
-   
Problems with the division of housework 
are not worth mentioning 
 
.45*** -  
Discussing who does which household 
chores is not appropriate 
 
.28*** .41*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 9    
Correlation for Items Forming the “Not Going to Improve” Factor of the Perceived 
Benefits of Avoidance of Domestic Labor Conflict Scale 
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement 
with the following statements. 
1 2  
Having a disagreement about the division of 
housework with my partner will lead to 
positive change (reversed) 
 
-  
Having a disagreement over housework with my 
partner will improve the situation  (reversed) 
 
.54*** - 
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 10        
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Dependent Variables 
      Husbands  Wives   
     Variable M  SD  M SD  r 
Global Domestic Labor Perf. (Hours 
per Week ) 
3.93 4.31  10.55 7.89  -.03 
Task-Specific Domestic Labor Perf.  
(Likert Scale) 
       
Clean bathroom(s) 2.71 1.62  5.64 1.68  -
.73*** 
Make bed(s) 2.95 1.83  5.06 1.93  -
.68*** 
Pick up clutter 3.48 1.44  5.33 1.31  -
.46*** 
Clean dishes 3.46 1.68  4.95 1.61  -
.72*** 
Dust 2.56 1.73  5.83 1.76  -
.60*** 
Laundry 2.23 1.54  5.84 1.56  -
.85*** 
Kitchen Surfaces 3.33 1.51  5.46 1.48  -
.64*** 
Take out trash 5.19 1.54  3.19 1.78  -
.69*** 
Vacuum / Sweep floor 3.26 1.83  5.19 1.86  -
.68*** 
Global Response Threshold (Gradated 
Measure) 
2.11 0.43  1.95 0.36  .36*** 
Global Response Threshold (Snapshot 
Measure) 
2.68 0.81  2.47 0.77 
 
 .33*** 
Global Response Threshold (Disorder 
Tolerance Measure) 
 
3.86 1.31  3.43 1.49  .21*** 
ask-Specific Response Threshold 
(Gradated Measure) 
       
Clean bathroom(s) 2.21 0.56  1.98 0.50  .26** 
Make bed(s) 2.15 0.75  1.91 0.80  .41** 
Pick up clutter 1.82 0.54  1.63 0.44  .25** 
Clean dishes 1.95 0.49  1.79 0.40  .38** 
Laundry 2.38 0.48  2.29 0.43  .29** 
Take out trash 2.15 0.36  2.10 0.34  .20* 
 
(continued) 
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      Husbands  Wives   
     Variable M  SD  M SD  r 
Task-Specific Response Threshold 
(Snapshot Measure) 
       
Clean bathroom(s) 2.73 1.22  2.34 1.21  .18* 
Make bed(s) 3.03 1.32  2.85 1.45  .43** 
Pick up clutter 1.86 1.13  1.40 0.70  .06 
Clean dishes 2.53 1.23  2.27 1.14  .32** 
Laundry 3.18 0.94  3.16 1.01  .14 
Take out trash 2.75 0.81  2.82 0.80  .21** 
Task-Specific Response Threshold 
(Disorder Tolerance Measure) 
       
Cl an bathroom(s) 3.52 1.55  3.14 1.87   
Make bed(s) 4.77 1.82  4.45 2.17  .19* 
Pick up clutter 3.71 1.71  3.01 1.77  .20* 
Clean dishes 3.24 1.68  2.83 1.75  .21** 
Dust 4.53 1.61  4.39 1.76  .16* 
Laundry 3.79 1.77  3.72 2.11  .18* 
Kitchen Surfaces 3.46 1.70  2.75 1.72  .15 
Take out trash 3.56 1.89  2.84 1.75  .20* 
Vacuum / Sweep floor 4.14 1.56  3.73 1.84  .20* 
Division of Labor Conflict Frequency 2.48 1.43  2.32 1.44  .42*** 
Mutual Avoidance 2.71 1.49  2.51 1.60  .38*** 
Mutual Constructive 4.61 1.53  4.61 1.87  .32*** 
Actor-Demand/Partner-Withdraw 2.17 1.22  2.18 1.53  .86*** 
Partner-Demand/Actor-Withdraw 2.37 1.46  1.79 1.25  .08  
*p < .20. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 11    
Significant Univariate Effects for Role Differences in Response Threshold 
 Dependent Variable df F Partial η2 
Global
a 
1,154 19.86*** 0.11 
Global
b
 1,154 7.70** .05 
Global
c 
1,154 8.88** .06 
Make bed(s)
a 
1,154 12.98*** 0.08 
Clean bathroom(s)
 a 1,154 20.1*** 0.12 
Clean bathroom(s)
 b
 1,147 7.51* 0.05 
Clean bathroom(s)
 c 
1,134 4.82* 0.04 
Clean dishes
a 
1,154 15.91*** 0.09 
Clean dishes
c
 1,134 5.19* 0.04 
Pick up clutter
a
 1,154 15.11*** 0.09 
Pick up clutter
b
 1,147 18.08*** 0.11 
Pick up clutter
c
 1,134 14.22*** 0.10 
Laundry
a
 1,154 4.71* 0.03 
Take out trash
c
 1,134 16.85*** 0.11 
Kitchen Surfaces
c
 1,134 16.34*** 0.11 
Vacuum / Sweep floor
c
 1,134 5.05* 0.04 
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Table 12       
Summary of APIM Analyses Predicting Task Performance From Response 
Threshold  
 
Domestic task 
Significant 
Predictors 
df F β t η2 
Clean bathroom(s) Actor threshold
a 
1,108 5.56** -0.89 -2.47 0.05 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,123 2.8* -0.17 -1.67 0.02 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
a 
1,81 0.08** 1.13 2.63 0.08 
 Role
a 
1,92 34.01**
* 
-2.29 -5.83 0.27 
 Role
b 
1,92 52.53**
* 
-2.67 -7.25 0.36 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
a
 
x role 
1,89 7.42** -2.16 -2.72 0.08 
Make bed(s) Actor threshold
a 
1,108 26.15**
* 
-1.08 -5.11 0.19 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,106 9.24** -0.37 -3.04 0.08 
 Actor threshold
c 
1,121 8.68** -0.2 -2.95 0.07 
 Partner threshold
a 
1,108 9.48*** 0.98 3.7 0.11 
 Partner threshold
b 
1,106 3.55** 0.47 2.91 0.07 
 Partner threshold
c 
1,126 4.13** 0.26 2.8 0.06 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
a
 
1,88 3.11* 0.26 1.77 0.03 
 Role
a 
1,91 7.12** -1.1 -2.67 0.07 
 Role
b
 1,91 14.8*** -1.58 -3.85 0.14 
 Role
c
 1,88 15.76**
* 
-1.65 -3.97 0.15 
 Partner threshold x 
role
a 
1,165 4.35* -0.67 -2.09 0.03 
 Partner threshold x 
role
b
 
1,158 6.96** -0.48 -2.64 0.04 
 Partner threshold x 
role
c
 
1,118 4.7* -0.24 -2.17 0.04 
(continued) 
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Domestic task Significant Predictors df F β t η2 
Clear clutter Actor threshold
a 
1,143 7.95** -0.61 -2.82 0.05 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,144 4.09* 0.21 -2.02 0.03 
 Partner threshold
a
 1,131 3.11* 0.37 1.76 0.02 
 Role
a 
1,96 20.24**
* 
-1.28 -4.5 0.17 
 Role
b 
1,96 22.75**
* 
-1.37 -4.77 0.19 
Clean dishes Actor threshold
a 
1,121 16.97**
* 
-1.27 -4.12 0.12 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,114 3.7* -0.22 -1.92 0.03 
 Actor threshold
c 
1,142 4.21* -0.12 0.21 0.00 
 Partner threshold
a 
1,114 11.58**
* 
1.03 3.4 0.09 
 Role
a
 1,93 4.47* -0.76 -2.12 0.05 
 Role
b
 1,96 4.86* -0.8 -2.21 0.05 
Dust Role
c
 1,85 52.31**
* 
-2.65 -7.23 0.38 
Laundry Actor threshold
a 
1,104 2.83* -0.49 -1.68 0.03 
 Actor threshold
c 
1,106 3.67* -0.16 -2.03 0.04 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
c 
1,84 1.1** -0.12 -2.62 0.08 
 Role
a 
1,94 90.66** -3.45 -9.52 0.49 
 Role
b 
1,94 96.64** -3.55 -9.83 0.51 
 Role
c
 1,90 87.29** -3.36 -9.34 0.49 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
role
c
 
1,89 6.24** 0.21 2.5 0.07 
Kitchen 
surfaces 
Actor threshold
c
 1,137 5.98** -0.16 -2.45 0.04 
 Role
c
 1,95 18.19**
* 
-1.38 -4.26 0.16 
(continued) 
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Domestic task Significant Predictors df F β t η2 
Take out trash Actor threshold
a 
1,111 10.38**
* 
-1.96 -4.01 0.13 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,119 5.71** -0.63 -2.85 0.06 
 Partner threshold
a 
1,113 8.42** 1.04 2.9 0.07 
 Partner threshold
b 
1,120 3.34* 0.28 1.83 0.03 
 Role
a 
1,93 67.46**
* 
2.78 8.21 0.42 
 Role
b 
1,89 50.64**
* 
2.43 7.12 0.36 
 Role
c
 1,89 53.06**
* 
2.6 7.28 0.37 
 Actor threshold
 
x role
a
 1,149 8.76** 1.61 2.96 0.06 
 Actor threshold
 
x role
b
 1,121 4.53* 0.51 2.13 0.04 
Vacuum/Sweep Actor threshold
c
 1,120 7.81*** -0.41 -4.11 0.12 
 Actor threshold
 
x 
partner threshold
c
 
1,77 4.92* 0.07 2.22 0.06 
 Role
c 
1,86 5.77** -0.95 -2.4 0.06 
 Actor threshold
 
x role
c 
1,121 7.01** 0.36 2.65 0.05 
Note: APIM = actor-partner interdependence model. For role, husbands served 
as the reference group. Degrees of freedom were rounded. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
a
Gradated response threshold APIM. 
b
Snapshot response threshold APIM. 
c
Disorder tolerance APIM. 
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Table 13       
Summary of APIM Analyses Predicting Dyadic Conflict (Demand-Withdraw) 
from Response Threshold  
 
Dependent Variable Significant 
Predictors 
df F β T η2 
Actor-Demand / 
Partner-Withdraw 
Actor threshold x 
role
b 
1,155 6.82* -0.51 -2.61 0.04 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
role
a 
1,90 4.11* -1.15 -2.03 0.04 
Partner – Demand / 
Actor-Withdraw  
Actor threshold
a 
1,138 3.04* 0.65 2.31 0.04 
 Actor threshold
b 
1,148 5.36* 0.29 2.38 0.04 
 Partner threshold
b 
1,146 1.18* -0.22 -1.8 0.02 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
a
 
 
1,84 0.09* -0.69 -1.81 0.04 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold
b 
1,82 0.56* 0.09 -1.85 0.04 
 Role
b
 1,88 6.82* 0.49 2.61 0.07 
 Role
c
 1,86 4.34* 0.39 2.08 0.05 
Note: APIM = actor-partner interdependence model. Degrees of freedom were 
rounded. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
a
Gradated response threshold APIM. 
b
Snapshot response threshold APIM. 
c
Disorder tolerance measure APIM. 
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Table 14       
Summary of APIM Analyses Predicting Dyadic Conflict (Mutual Avoidance) 
from Response Threshold  
 
Dependent Variable Significant 
Predictors 
df F β t η2 
Mutual Avoidance Actor “easier to do 
it myself”a 
1,174 15*** 0.16 3.87 0.08 
 Actor “easier to do 
it myself”b 
1,169 9.64*** 0.13 3.1 0.05 
 Actor “easier to do 
it myself”c 
1,161 5.68* 0.1 2.38 0.03 
 Actor “not worth 
fighting about”a 
1,160 11.42**
* 
0.15 3.38 0.07 
 Actor “not worth 
fighting about”b 
1,157 7.39** 0.12 2.72 0.05 
 Actor “not worth 
fighting about”c 
1,166 7.42** 0.13 2.73 0.04 
 Partner threshold x 
actor “easier to do 
it myself”a 
1,148 4.24* 0.24 2.06 0.03 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
actor “easier to do 
it myself”a 
1,153 13.2*** -0.6 -3.63 0.08 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
actor “easier to do 
it myself”b 
1,150 10.16**
* 
-0.17 -3.19 0.06 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
actor “not worth 
fighting about”a 
1,126 7.95** -0.6 -2.82 0.06 
 Actor threshold x 
partner threshold x 
actor “not worth 
fighting about”b 
1,114 6.55* -0.17 -2.56 0.05 
 
 
     
Note: APIM = actor-partner interdependence model. Degrees of freedom were 
rounded. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
a
Gradated response threshold APIM. 
b
Snapshot response threshold APIM. 
c
Disorder tolerance APIM. 
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